

1183. If Procedural Law had been observed and applied to Group 3. Prisoners,

EVERY SUCH PRISONER [see text at 1164, *ibid.*], per DVE PROCESS, IN COMPLIANCE AND ACCORDANCE WITH 'CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPETENT STATUTE (C.I.)', WOULD BE EXEMPT FROM ANY FEATURE OF DCS Act, ss. 67(9), 67(10), AND, ANY FEATURE OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ASSENTED DCS Act, ss. 67(7A), 67(7B), 67(7C) ([107, 108, AND 109], [102, 103, 104, AND 105]), INSTEAD, SUCH LIFERS WOULD BE DVE PROCESSED BY MEANS AND METHOD DESCRIBED IN WATSON [194, (PARA. 68.)], FOR REASONS DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT [see text at 1173, TO 1177.]. For like reasons of COMPETENT JURISDICTION, AND,

Procedural Law compliance, points featured in references at [151, AND 172.], MUST NEVER BE IMPOSED UPON A LIFER, AS PART OF THEIR SENTENCE, IF NOT (AT THE VERY LEAST), IMPOSED BY A COMPETENT COURT (FOR SENTENCING), AND SO, IF, AS AN EXAMPLE, A SENTENCED LIFER WAS SENTENCED BY A COMPETENT COURT PRIOR TO 'COMMENCEMENT OF 2016 PAROLE AMENDMENTS (RE APPLICATIONS FOR PAROLE BY LIFERS)', AND THEREFORE WAS NOT EXISTING WITHIN SENTENCING STANDARDS AT TIME RESPECTIVE LIFER WAS SENTENCED, STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS WHICH OPERATED AFTER THEIR SENTENCING, SUCH AS 'LIFER REMAINS ON PAROLE FOR REST OF THEIR LIFE', MUST NOT BE APPLIED TO RESPECTIVE LIFER IN PLACE OF PREVIOUS SECTION (OF DCS Act), WHICH MANDATED PAROLE RELEASE FOR AT LEAST 3. YEARS AND AT MOST 10. YEARS, IF NOT COURT IMPOSED, AS SUCH A SENTENCING STANDARD IS ONE WHICH MUST BE COURT IMPOSED BY COMPETENT SENTENCING COURT, 'IT' IS NOT AN ADMINISTRATIVE FEATURE, 'IT' IS INTRINSIC TO PENALTY OF SENTENCE AND IS, BY ITS NATURAL FORM, CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, WHICH THEREFORE ALSO CANNOT BE IMPOSED BY CH.II [3.1] ENTITY, ONLY BY CH.III [3.1] ENTITY (THE COURTS), AS EVERY LIFER'S SENTENCE CAN ONLY BE IMPOSED BY A COMPETENT COURT ([see text at 846, 847, *ibid.*]), AND NEVER BY CH.I OR CH.II [3.1].

1191. THE FACT IS THAT COMPETENT STATUTE DOES EXIST FOR SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (CH.I [3.1]), TO OBSERVE AND APPLY, PERTAINING TO CIRCUMSTANCES

WHERE A LIFER (WITH COURT IMPOSED NP), INITIATES 'PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION', TO THE PAROLE BOARD (IN WRITING), AND STATE GOVERNMENT DOESN'T WANT TO RELEASE RESPECTIVE LIFER, THEREFORE, AND IRRESPECTIVE OF SAID APPLICATION TO PAROLE BOARD, STATE GOVERNMENT MUST APPLY COMPETENT STATUTE TO SUCH A SITUATION, WHICH IS

1192. ONLY THE CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING) ACT, S.A., AND, IS NOT NOR CAN IT EVER BE THE (ADMINISTRATIVE STATUTE) CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT, SA, THEN, RELEVANT SECTIONS OF CLSA MUST BE OPERATED TO REQUEST COMPETENT COURT TO EXTEND/NEGATE EXISTING NP' ([38, 39, 40, 44, 45, 84, 85, AND 194. (PARAS. 39, 68.)]), CONSEQUENTIAL TO WHICH, A COURT'S RULING MUST THEN FOLLOW. THE

1193. WERE FACT THAT SUCH COMPETENT STATUTE EXISTED PRIOR TO 1-8-1994 ([46.]), MEANS THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT KNEW EXACTLY HOW IT MUST ACT TO SEEK ITS INTENDED OUTCOME ('KEEP RESPECTIVE LIFER IN PRISON LONGER', BY COURT INCREASING/EXTENDING EXISTING IMPOSED NP), BUT RATHER THAN COMPLY

1194. WITH PROCEDURAL LAW (RELATING TO THIS SAID PROCESS), STATE GOVERNMENT IMPROPERLY, DECEPTIVELY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY (C1. AND 3.1), VIOLATED COMPETENT JURISDICTION, VIOLATED RELEVANT PROCEDURAL LAWS AND ACTED ONLY WITHIN THE REAM OF CH. II [3.1] TO CREATE ITS OWN DETERMINED PROCESS FOR 'KEEPING RESPECTIVE LIFER IN PRISON LONGER', AT THE FIRST DATE OF OPERATION OF [46.] (1-8-1994), SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT TREATED GROUP 3. PRISONERS [SEE TEXT AT 1164, *IBID*] APPLYING (TO THE BOARD) FOR PAROLE IN THE SAME 'PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESSING FORMAT', AS GROUP 2.

1195. PRISONERS [SEE TEXT AT 1163, *IBID*], AND THEREFORE, WHEN THE BOARD REJECTED A GROUP 2. PRISONER AND GROUP 3. PRISONER PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION, THE RESPECTIVE PRISONERS WERE EQUALLY SUBJECTED TO THE OPERATION OF DCS ACT, ss. 67(9) AND 67(10) ([107, 108, AND 109.]). WHAT THAT ALSO MEANT FOR RESPECTIVE GROUP 3. PRISONER (PAROLE) APPLICANTS, AS AT 1-8-1994 ([46.]), WAS, AFTER BOARD RECOMMENDED PAROLE CONDITIONS TO GOVERNOR (C100, AND 101.1), GOVERNMENT CABINET (IF PAROLE IS NOT EFFECTED), THEN UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VOIDS BOARDS' COMPETENT JURISDICTION (C1. AND 3.1 [38. AND 45.]), AND THEN DIRECTS BOARD OF 'ITS RESECTION OF RESPECTIVE PAROLE-RELEASE SUBMISSION', TO WHICH

THE BOARD (WHO FALSELY, ERRONEOUSLY, UNCONSTITUTIONALLY [1. AND 3.]) BELIEVE THEY MUST PROCEDURALLY (DUE PROCESS/PROCEDURAL LAW), COMPLY WITH AND ABIDE BY, EVEN THOUGH THE GOVERNOR/EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT HELD NO COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY (AS A PROCEDURAL RIGHT IN PROCEDURAL LAW), TO VETO BOARDS' 'RELEASE RECOMMENDATION' (AS DESCRIBED IN MORE DETAIL WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT)), THEN EMBARKED ON ITS NEXT PLATFORM OF PROCEDURAL LAW VIOLATIONS

BY RE-SENTENCING RESPECTIVE LIFER (ITSELF (DCS. Act. s. 67(9) [107.1]), THEN ILLEGALLY (FRAUDULENTLY), NOTIFIED RESPECTIVE (GROUP 3.) LIFER OF THEIR 'NEW' AND ILLEGALLY CREATED STATE GOVERNMENT CREATED AND IMPOSED 'NPP OF TIME' (DCS. Act ss. 67(9)(a), 67(9)(b), 67(9)(c), 67(10) [107, 108, AND 109.1], INSTEAD OF AND IN PLACE OF THE COURTS' CREATED AND IMPOSED NPP AND NPP OF TIME (EVEN THOUGH 'NPP OF TIME CAN'T LAWFULLY BE CREATED OR IMPOSED IN CH. II [3.], AGAINST A LIFER). THEN, TO COMPOUND THE ILLEGALITY AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOUR ([1.]), OF THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, AND BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT (AS THEY PASSED THE RESPECTIVE FRAUDULENT PROPOSALS (AS BILL TO AMEND RELATED STATUTES), PRIOR TO SAME BEING "ASSENTED" FOR APPLICATION [15, AND 18.1]), TO ILLEGALLY CREATE A CRIMINALLY DECEPTIVE STATUTORY MEANS, TO UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ^{HARM} A RESPECTIVE LIFER (APPLYING FOR PAROLE-RELEASE), JUST SO THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT CAN KEEP LIFERS IN PRISON LONGER, AND TO MAKE IT EVEN HARDER FOR LIFERS TO RECEIVE PAROLE RELEASE, AND WITH MORE ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTY/ENCUMBRANCE THAN WAS REALISED BY RESPECTIVE SENTENCING COURT, DCS Act. ss. 67 (7A), 67 (7B), 67 (7C) WERE CREATED ([102, 103, 104, AND 105.], IN 2012). I DON'T CARE IF THE RESPECTIVE BILL ([102.1]), WAS A DELIBERATE DECEPTION (REGARDING ITS COMPETENT JURISDICTION [18, 27, 36, 38, 44, 45, 82, 83, 84, 85, 110, AND 113.]), OR THE CONSEQUENCE OF

PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE AND/OR PROFESSIONAL INCOMPETENCE, AS THE FACT REMAINS THAT [102.] AMENDMENTS WERE ILLEGALLY ASSENTED, DUE TO THEIR PROHIBITED OPERATIONAL EFFECTS, YET, THOSE SAID [102.] AMENDMENTS CREATED IN STATUTORY DESCRIPTION, A CRIMINALLY DECEPTIVE, 'WORDED/Written PATHWAY' TO POINT TO, AS A 'JUSTIFICATION', FOR POLITICISING PAROLE APPLICATIONS

1196. 1197. 1198. 1199.

BY LIFE, AND IN SUCH A WAY THAT ALSO CREATES 'POLITICAL PRISONERS' (BY USING CABINET CONFIDENTIALITY (104, AND 105.1), AS A GUARD AGAINST REASON OF

THE STATE GOVERNMENT POLITICIANS FOR REJECTING PAROLE APPLICATION BEING

REVEALED/RELEASED TO RESPECTIVE LIFE APPLICANT), AND, USING SUCH WORDS/

WRITTEN PATHWAY, THEN, ACCORDING TO CROWN SOLICITORS OFFICE, ATTORNEY -

GENERAL, PREMIER, DCS MINISTER, DCS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND

CORRECTIONAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, ALLOWS FOR A SMOOTHER STATUTORY STEP

INTO THE OPERATION OF DCS ACT. SS. 67(9) AND 67(10) [107, 108, AND 109.1.

HOWEVER, SAID 102.1 AMENDMENTS VIOLATED PROCEDURAL LAW, IN THEIR

ACTUAL OPERATION, BECAUSE THEY ILLEGALLY CLAIMED PROCEDURAL RIGHTS TO

'EXIST', 'TO OPERATE', TO 'BE APPLIED TO A LIFE'S PAROLE APPLICATION', EXCEPT,

COMPETENT STATUTORY MANDATES, WITH THE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION OF THE

CONSTITUTION 1.1, FORBID AND PROHIBIT ANY USE OF 102, 103, 104, AND

105.1. WITHIN THE 55 WORDS OF DCS ACT S. 67(7A), THE FIRST 18 WORDS

PROOF ITS FRAUD, SPECIFICALLY, "IF THE GOVERNOR DOES NOT APPROVE THE

RECOMMENDATION OF THE BOARD THAT A PRISONER BE RELEASED ON

PAROLE... BECAUSE, IN DCS ACT. S. 67(6) "RECOMMEND TO THE GOVERNOR

"IS A RECOMMEND" (100.1), THE WORD "RECOMMEND" IS A

PREREQUISITE WORD SO THAT, IF BOARD INTENDS PAROLE RELEASE, IT MUST THEN

PROGRESS TO CONDITIONS 67(6)(a)(i) AND 67(6)(a)(ii) [100.1 ONLY, BUT

DOES NOT EMPOWER GOVERNOR WITH VETO OVER BOARD TO DENY

PAROLE, AS QUALIFIED IN 67(7) [101.1] (WHEN RELEASE AND PAROLE FOR

HOW LONG). STATE LAW CANNOT BE CREATED TO VIOLATE COMPETENT

PROCEDURAL LAW, SO 102.1 CANNOT EXIST COMPETENTLY AS AN

ALTERNATIVE TO PROCEDURAL LAW WHICH MANDATES USE OF [38.1]

IN A COURT. THE CONSTITUTION 1.1 DOES NOT PERMIT, IN ANY REALM

ASSIGNMENT BETWEEN CH. I, CH. II, CH. III ([3.1], ANY PROCEDURAL

LAW RIGHT TO CREATE, IMPOSE, THEN ENFORCE A SENTENCE UPON A LIFE,

WITHIN SOUTH AUSTRALIAN OPERATION OF STATE GOVERNMENT BUSINESS, AS THAT

ACTION WOULD EFFECT CONSTITUTIONAL FRAUD, POINT FEATURED AT TEXT 1165.

1203.

1202.

1201.

1200.

TO 1174, IBID, AS THAT ACTION WOULD VIOLATE AIA s. 22 A. [28.] (FOR REASONS REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT. [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, IBID], AS THAT ACTION WOULD 'INVOKE CONSTITUTIONAL (E1.) GUARD AGAINST ANY VALIDITY EXISTING FROM SUCH ACTION' (ULTRA VIRES [82, AND 83.]), AS THAT ACTION HOLDS NO CRIMINAL LAW CODE OF ENTITLEMENT (CRIMINAL JURISDICTION), TO ILLEGALLY ACT AS A SENTENCING COURT (WHEN BOARD CREATES 'NPP OF TIME' [107, AND 108.] (PCS Act. ss. 67(9), 67(9)(c) "A DATE NOT LESS THAN SIX MONTHS OR MORE THAN ONE YEAR AFTER THE DATE ON WHICH THE BOARD REFUSES THE APPLICATION, BEFORE WHICH THE BOARD WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY FURTHER APPLICATION BY THE PRISONER FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE."). WHAT THE S.A. GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT DID, TO ENABLE THE TABLING, DEBATING, DISCUSSING AND PASSING THROUGH BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, BOTH, THE BILL WHICH BECAME [46.], AND, THE BILL WHICH BECAME [102., 103., 104., 105., 47.], WAS TO TREAT THEIR STATUTORY (E1.) LIMITATIONS RE CONSTRUCTION OF AMENDMENTS TO EXISTING STATE ACTS (E13, AND 28.), WITH PERFUNCTORY AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT, AND PROFESSIONAL (AS M.P.'S IN THE HOUSE), DISREGARD FOR THEIR INDIVIDUAL CONSTITUTIONAL (E1, AND 3.) OBLIGATIONS, RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS, CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTIONAL (E1.) LEGALITY AND PERMISSION OPEN TO THEM, TO EFFECT THENAFTER (IF COMPLIANT, THEREFORE NOT ULTRA VIRES), A LAWFULLY UNDERTAKEN 'BILL VOTE' IN THE HOUSE. I SUGGEST THAT RATHER THAN RELY ON FALSE CLAIMS BY ATTORNEY-GENERAL (CLAIMING LEGALITY IN PROPOSED AMENDMENTS), BOTH HOUSES SEEK OFFICIAL REPORT BY INDEPENDENT 'CONSTITUTIONAL LAW' LAWYER, WITH INTENTION OF IDENTIFYING ('THEREIN'), ^{ANY} ~~THE~~ PROPOSED SAID AMENDMENT WHICH MAY BE CONSTITUTIONALLY (E1.) PROHIBITED, THEREFORE ILLEGAL ([82, AND 83.]).

IF A PERSON/ENTITY HOLDS NO SECTION IN ANY COMPETENT STATUTE, NO PROCEDURE IN ANY DUE PROCESS (ACCORDING TO LAW), TO ACT, THEN, IF THEY ACT, AS IF THEY DID HAVE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, EVERYTHING THEREFROM DONE IS ULTRA VIRES, INVALID AND DECEPTIVELY DONE, AND MUST BE EXPUNGED FROM EFFECTATION, [200, AND 201.]

1207.

THEN, TO COMPOUND THE ILLEGALITY AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, AND BOTH LEGISLATIVE HOUSES (INVOLVED IN 'BILL VOTING'), TO FRAUDULENTLY CREATE STATUTE AMENDMENTS RELATING TO 'LIFE SENTENCED PRISONERS' (FURTHER TO [TEXT AT 1197. 1810]), ALBEIT BY INADVERTANCE (SUCH AS PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE, PROFESSIONAL INCOMPETENCE, AND PROFESSIONAL DISREGARD TO THE REQUIREMENT OF INTEGRITY DURING THE ACT OF 'BILL VOTING IN PARLIAMENT'), RATHER THAN DELIBERATE CRIMINAL DECEPTION AND CRIMINAL ~~ABUSE~~ ABUSE OF THE FUNCTION OF PARLIAMENT (TO THEREIN CREATE/PASS ~~FALS STATUTE~~ FALSE STATUTE), THE GOVERNOR WAS AGAIN IMPROPERLY AND

1208.

FRAUDULENTLY USED ([15.]), TO EFFECT INTO STATUTE (THE 'CORRECTIONAL SERVICES (PAROLE) AMENDMENT BILL [2015]' ([140., 162., 179. AND 187.]), 'CERTAIN AMENDMENTS WHICH, ~~IF OPERATED/ACTION~~ IF ENGAGED IN OPERATIONAL EFFECT, WOULD BE DONE WITHOUT JURISDICTIONAL RIGHT/COMPETENCE, AND WOULD UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]) CREATE AND CAUSE HARM TO THE RESPECTIVE

1209.

LIFER (TO WHOM SUCH OPERATIONAL EFFECTS ARE PURSUED). ONE OF THE MAJOR FLAWS IN THE PAROLE AMENDMENT BILL (WHICH IN 2016 BECAME OPERATIONAL WITHIN RESPECTIVE PRINCIPAL ACTS), IS THAT THE OPERATION OF PAROLE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW COMMISSION (PARC), INVOKES PROCEDURAL LAW RIGHTS OWNED BY THE RESPECTIVE LIFER (APPLYING FOR PAROLE RELEASE), WHICH, IN LAW, WHICH ACTIONS ONLY WITHIN CH. III [3.], BEING SUBSTANTIVE LAW, IN FACT PROHIBITS ANY OPERATION OF THE PARC IN THE CURRENT FORM OF ITS

1210.

OPERATIONS. THE PARC IS A "JUDICIAL BODY" [33.], AND IT HOLDS ONLY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JURISDICTION, AND IT DOES NOT HOLD ANY CRIMINAL LAW

1211.

JURISDICTION, AND IT ADMINISTRATIVELY OPERATES ONLY WITHIN CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT ([85.]), AND IT DOES NOT OPERATE WITHIN CRIMINAL LAW

1212.

(SENTENCING) ACT ([84.]), AND ~~IT~~ IT ADMINISTRATIVELY EXISTS ONLY WITHIN CH. II [3.], AND IT DOES NOT OPERATE OR EXIST IN ANY JURISDICTIONAL AND/OR COMPETENT FORM WITHIN CH. III [3.], AND ITS OPERATIONAL EFFECTS MUST ONLY EXIST ADMINISTRATIVELY WITHIN THE COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT, S.A. ([85.]), AND ITS OPERATIONAL EFFECTS MUST

NEVER BE PARTY TO/A PARTICIPANT IN THE CREATION, IMPOSITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF A NRP OF TIME, WHICH IS CREATED IN CH. II E3.1 (SUCH AS BY PAROLE BOARD ACTIONING DCS Act, s. 67(9) E107, 108, AND 109.1, AND YET THE PARC

ALREADY OPERATES IN SUCH UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER, BEING PARTY TO 'REJECTED PAROLE APPLICANTS HAVE IMPOSED UPON THEM A 'NEW NRP OF TIME', AND AS A JUDICIAL BODY THE PARC MUST NOT ENGAGE IN ANY SECRET MEETINGS/HEARINGS,

RELATING TO A SPECIFIC LIFER PAROLE APPLICATION, WITHIN WHICH SAID LIFER IS NOT REPRESENTING THEMSELF IN PERSON (E148.1 VIOLATES E113.1), OR BEING REPRESENTED BY THEIR LAWYER (E113.1), AS EVERY ASPECT OF A PAROLE APPLICATION IS IN FACT PART OF "ANY PROCEEDING BEFORE THE BOARD", WHERE

THE PARC OPERATES WITHIN THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PAROLE BOARD, AND SO IS WITHIN THE OPERATIONAL ENVELOPE OF THE ACCRUED SUBSTANTIVE LAW RIGHT AT E113.1, AND IN PROCEDURAL LAW (DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO LAW), SUCH AS A LIFER APPLICANT HAS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROTECT THEIR

SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS, BY OPERATION OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION

TO OBSERVE AND APPLY ONLY SUCH ACTIONS CONSTITUTIONALLY (E1.1) PERMITTED, BY THE RESPECTIVE BODY. THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF E148.1, VIOLATED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT AS OVERSEER OF OPERATION OF DCS Act, SA, BY DEPARTMENT FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, IS PROHIBITED IN BOTH

SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND PROCEDURAL LAW. THE STATE (BOARD), CANNOT REPRESENT A PRISONER AGAINST THE STATE (VICTIMS OF CRIME COMMISSIONER (GOVERNMENT AGENCY), POLICE COMMISSIONER (GOVERNMENT

AGENT), ATTORNEY-GENERAL (EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT AGENT), THE COMMISSIONER (GOVERNMENT AGENT, WHO BY LAW MUST ONLY INVESTIGATE

LEGALITY OF CHALLENGE BY CHALLENGER, AND NEVER MAKE ADMINISTRATIVE RULING THAT CONSEQUENCES ILLEGAL CREATION OF A NRP OF TIME, OR PARTICIPATES IN PERSONAL AGENDA FRAUDULENT CHALLENGE), AS THAT WOULD CLEARLY VIOLATE THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT AT E113.1, AND CONTRAVENE THE INTENTION

OF PARLIAMENT IN THEIR CREATION OF SUCH 'PRISONERS RIGHT' (E113.1). IF THE BOARD WAS TO BE PRESENT AT SUCH CHALLENGE HEARING (E145, 146, 147, AND

1217. 149.]), BY PROPER APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THE BOARD IS ONLY PERMITTED TO REPRESENT 'ITSELF', AND 'ITS DECISION' WHICH IS UNDER CHALLENGE, BUT THE LIFER'S APPLICATION PROPER IS WHAT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY PARC, AND MUST BE COMPLIANT (BY PERSON), WITH [113,] SO THAT THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW RIGHTS OWNED BY RESPECTIVE LIFER, ARE, DURING EVERY PHASE OF THEIR PAROLE APPLICATION, PROCESSED AND ACTIONED BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT IN A MANNER WHICH, THROUGH COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL OBSERVANCE AND COMPLIANCE, THE GOVERNING ACT [1.] PERMITS (EXAMPLE, WHERE CH. II [3.] ACTION CREATES 'NPP OF TIME' FOR LIFER, WHICH COURT DID NOT IMPOSE AND WHICH IS LONGER THAN COURT'S IMPOSED NPP OF TIME, EQUATES TO AN ACTION NOT PERMITTED (ULTRA VIRES)).
1218. THE SA. PARLIAMENT (WHEN HEARING AND DISCUSSING BILLS RELATING TO 'LIFER PRISONERS' (CH. I [3.])), AND THE SA. GOVERNMENT (WHEN PREPARING A GOVERNMENT'S BILL (FOR SUBMITTING TO PARLIAMENT), WHEN NOTIFYING GOVERNOR ON VALIDITY/ CONSTITUTIONAL ([1.] PERMISSIBILITY OF SUCH A BILL (AND ANY OTHER BILL RELATING TO 'LIFER PRISONERS'), FOR ASSENT BY GOVERNOR [15.] (CH. II [3.])), AND THE SA. GOVERNMENT (WHEN 'IT' IS CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] OBLIGATED ([SEE TEXT AT 846, 847. IBID])), TO ENFORCE THE WILL, ORDER AND IMPOSED SENTENCE (UPON RESPECTIVE SENTENCED LIFER), OF THE
1219. COMPETENT COURT (CH. III [3.])), THE PARLIAMENT AND STATE GOVERNMENT HAVE FAILED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COMPLIANCE, WHEN THEY EFFECT 'PROCEDURAL CHANGES TO PRINCIPAL ACTS', RELATING TO 'LIFER PRISONERS', WHICH, UPON OPERATION OF SUCH PROCEDURAL CHANGES TO PRINCIPAL ACTS (EXAMPLE 'CHANGES' INCLUDE [46., 151. AND 172.]), UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ([1. AND 3.]), VIOLATES A RESPECTIVE LIFER'S SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS TO JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE OF THEIR IMPOSED SENTENCE, BY A COMPETENT COURT IN CH. III [3.], AS DESCRIBED FURTHER
1220. THROUGHOUT THIS DOCUMENT. THE PENALTY OF SENTENCE UPON A LIFER CAN ONLY BE INCREASED BY AND WITHIN CH. III [3.], AND SO SAYS THE CONSTITUTION [1. AND 3.], AS A LIFER'S SENTENCE EXISTS AS A CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION CREATION, THEREBY ENVELOPING SAID SENTENCE AND ITS IMPOSED PENALTY, IN

- THE FIELD OF CRIMINAL LAW OPERATIONS, HENCE, CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING) ACT, S.A. THE PENALTY PROPER, WHICH THE COURT GOVERNS (CH. III [3.1]), IS 'NPP DATE', AS STIPULATED BY COURT, AND 'HEAD-SENTENCE', AS STIPULATED BY COURT.
- THE 'NPP OF TIME' IS THE 'PASSAGE OF TIME' WHICH MUST BE ENFORCED BY STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.1]), BY HOLDING CUSTODY OF RESPECTIVE LIFER IN ACCORDANCE WITH COURT'S ORDER OF SENTENCE IMPOSED (IN CH. III [3.1]), AND THAT 'PASSAGE OF TIME' IS FROM 'SENTENCING DATE' THROUGH TO 'NPP DATE', THEREFORE, THE 'NPP ~~DATE~~ OF TIME' FORMS PART OF THE COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE UPON RESPECTIVE LIFER, AND, ALTHOUGH SAID 'NPP OF TIME' IS ADMINISTERED BY STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.1]), ITS EXISTENCE (WHICH IS INTRINSIC TO THE CREATION AND IMPOSITION OF 'NPP DATE' BY THE COURT'S COMPETENT JURISDICTION, IN CRIMINAL LAW (CH. III [3.1])), IS ALSO OWNED BY CH. III [3.1], AND ITS FORMATION (BEING INTRINSICALLY LINKED TO COURT'S CREATION AND IMPOSITION OF 'NPP DATE'), IS ALSO OWNED BY CH. III [3.1], AND TO INCREASE RESPECTIVE LIFER'S 'NPP DATE', WHICH CONSEQUENTIALLY INCREASES 'NPP OF TIME', MEANS THAT ONLY CHAPTER III [1. AND 3.], HOLDS CONSTITUTIONAL (1.1) COMPETENCE TO INCREASE LIFER'S 'NPP OF TIME'. A 'NPP OF TIME' HAS NO JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO BE CREATED BY ANY STATE GOVERNMENT ENTITY IN CHAPTER II [1. AND 3.], AND, THEREFORE,
- WITH REGARD TO A LIFER'S IMPOSED 'NPP DATE' AND (INTRINSICALLY ANCHORED TO), 'NPP OF TIME', NO STATE GOVERNMENT CAN LAWFULLY (1.1), OPERATE ANY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENT / GOVERNMENT CREATED ACTION (WHICH INCLUDES STATUTORY AMENDMENTS), WHICH IN ITS EFFECTATION ENGAGES AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL OUTCOME, SUCH AS, SA PAROLE BOARD REFUSING PAROLE TO LIFER APPLICANT, THEN CREATING 'FAKE SENTENCE NEW NPP OF TIME', AND 'FAKE SENTENCE NEW 'NPP DATE', SA PAROLE BOARD RECOMMEND PAROLE RELEASE WHICH CABINET / GOVERNOR THEN REFUSES TO ACCEPT CONSEQUENTING 'NEW FAKE SENTENCE', PARC HAVING SECRET MEETINGS ABOUT SPECIFIC LIFER APPLICANT (113.1), PARC HAVING SECRET MEETINGS WHICH LIFER IS NOT REPRESENTED IN (113.1), AND REFUSES TO ACCEPT PAROLE RELEASE THEN BEING PARTY TO THE

CREATION, IMPOSITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF SAID 'NEW FAKE SENTENCE' (AS THE PARC'S OPERATIONS WHICH CREATE 'PAROLE REJECTION CIRCUMSTANCE', IS WHAT THE BOARD THEN ACTIONS FROM, TOWARDS NOTIFYING AND ENFORCING AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFER, SAID NEW FAKE SENTENCE), AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFER (AND WHICH ALL ~~██████~~ HAPPENS WITHIN CH. II [3.] TO RE-SENTENCE A LIFER, WITHOUT ANY OF THE (REQUIRED) CH. III [3.] PROCEDURAL LAWS BEING

1229.

OBSERVED OR APPLIED, IN RELATION TO RESENTENCING (A LIFER). IF THE PARC

[SEE TEXT AT 1209, 1210, 1211, 1212, 1213. IBID], WISH TO LAWFULLY EXIST AND OPERATE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL (I.), THEREFORE PERMISSIBLE, COMPETENCE, IT MUST EXPUNGE SPECIFIC ACTIONS/OPERATIONAL ACTS WHICH PRESENTLY ATTACH

(IN STATUTE), TO ITS PROCEDURAL PROCESSES (AS SUCH PROCESSES ARE ILLEGALLY ACTIONABLE WITHIN CURRENT STATUTE), OTHERWISE, THE PARC WILL CONTINUE TO CRIMINALLY VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL (I.) COMPETENCE (WHEN ITS OPERATIONS AND STATUTE WORDED CLAIMED OPERATIONAL COMPETENCE, ARE JUDICIALLY

1230.

INVESTIGATED [3., 5., 6., 7. AND 11.]). SOME OF THE KEY PARTS OF PARC

OPERATIONS WHICH MUST NOT EXIST THEREIN, INCLUDE (BUT CERTAINLY NOT

1231.

LIMITED TO), THE PARC OPERATING AS A 'LEGALITY REVIEW OF BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION TO PAROLE-RELEASE, RESPECTIVE LIFER' (EFFECTIVELY, A REVIEW OF THE LEGALITY OF THE DECISION TO RECOMMEND PAROLE (IS IT LEGAL, OR IS IT NOT?), AND IF 'NOT' THEN FORMALLY NOTIFY BOARD AND PRISONER, AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL, RETURN TO BOARD THE LIFER'S APPLICATION FOR AMENDING, THEN AWAIT

1232.

ITS AMENDED RE-SUBMISSION FROM BOARD), SUCH 'REVIEW PERFORMED BY THE

1233.

COMMISSIONER AND PARC STAFF ONLY', 'NO SECRET MEETINGS BETWEEN PARC AND ANY OTHER PARTY' [113.] (148.) SITUATION NOT PERMITTED, SO, ~~██████~~ ^{PRISONER} WILL

REPRESENT THEIR APPLICATION FOR PAROLE (OR THEIR LAWYER [113.]), AND IF PRISONER REQUIRED FOR A PARC HEARING, THEN LIKELY BETTER DONE VIA VIDEO LINK, ~~██████~~

AND BOARD SHALL ~~██~~ ONLY REPRESENT THEIR OWN RECOMMENDATION (WHICH IS THE MATTER UNDER REVIEW BY THE ~~██████~~ PARC, THE BOARD'S WRITTEN

1234.

RECOMMENDATION FOR PAROLE-RELEASE)), 'ONE ADDITIONAL REPORT TO BE INCLUDED WITH BOARD'S PAROLE RECOMMENDATION TO THE PARC' (CONSIDERING

1235. THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION DOCUMENT PROPER, SHOULD ALSO IDENTIFY ALL THE 'CONDITIONS' TO BE IMPOSED UPON LIFER DURING THEIR PAROLE, IF, DURING BOARD'S 'CONSIDERATION PHASE' OF PAROLE APPLICATION BY LIFER, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD MAY SUBMIT DIFFERENT 'CONDITIONS' WHICH THEY INDIVIDUALLY WOULD PREFER, PLACED UPON RESPECTIVE LIFERS, EVEN THOUGH ONLY THE BOARD'S CONDITION IS WHAT IS 'RECOMMENDED AND FORWARDED TO THE PARC', EXAMPLE BEING THREE BOARD MEMBERS INDIVIDUALLY SUBMIT CURFEW HOURS THEY DEEM APPROPRIATE (BUT NONE ACCEPTED UNDER BOARD VOTE, BUT 4TH BOARD MEMBER'S CURFEW SUBMISSION IS THE DECISION OF THE BOARD), SO THE SAID 'ADDITIONAL REPORT' WOULD IDENTIFY THE VARIOUS CONDITIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS, REASONS THE BOARD DECIDED ON SPECIFIC CONDITIONS, BUT THE PARC GETS TO REVIEW 'LEGALITY OF BOARD'S SPECIFIC CONDITION CHOSEN', PARTICULARLY IF ^{THERE} IS A ~~REDACTED~~ HINT/SUGGESTION OF 'UNFAIR' CONDITION).
1236. FURTHER TO THE ISSUE OF 'LEGALITY OF EXISTENCE OF THE PARC', DUE TO SPECIFIC PROCEDURES/PROCESSES WHICH IT CURRENTLY EMPLOYS [SEE TEXT AT 1229, 1230. IBID], IT IS NOT INSIGNIFICANT THAT THE PARC, JUST LIKE CABINET
1237. DID (WHEN BOARD, UNDER PREVIOUS PAROLE APPLICATION PROCEDURES, WOULD IMPROPERLY SEND ENTIRE PAROLE APPLICATION (WITH VETO AUTHORITY OPERATED BY GOVERNOR [29.]), RATHER THAN GOVERNOR [29.], PER STATUTORY NARROW SCOPE OVER ONLY TWO CONDITIONS (DCS ACT. SS 67(6)(A)(i), 67(6)(A)(ii) [100.]), WAS ONLY EMPOWERED TO DISCRETIONATELY CONSIDER MUCH LESS THAN
1238. IT/THEY ^{THOUGHT} WERE COMPETENTLY AUTHORIZED), WITH GOVERNOR [29.] MEETINGS/HEARINGS ABOUT SPECIFIC LIFER'S SAID PAROLE APPLICATION, BEING SECRET MEETINGS, IN STATUTORY VIOLATION OF PROTECTED SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT ([113.]) TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION DURING ALL AND "ANY PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE BOARD RELATE IS ENTITLED TO BE REPRESENTED IN THOSE PROCEEDINGS
1239. BY A LEGAL PRACTITIONER.", THEN, WRITTEN EVIDENCE OF SAID SECRET MEETING (IE. TRANSCRIPT), WAS DENIED TO 'THE BOARD' AND 'THE LIFER APPLICANT',
1240. HENCE, SECRET DISCUSSIONS (CONTENTS OF), THEN, IF CONSEQUENCE OF BOARD SUBMITTING TO GOVERNOR ([29., 100. AND 101.]), WAS 'REJECTED PAROLE-RELEASE THEN NEW FAKE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY STATE' ([107., 108. AND 109.]), IS

CONTINUING WITH SECRET MEETINGS WHICH PRISONER OR THEIR ^{LAWYER} ~~REPRESENTATIVE~~

([113.]), ARE NOT PRESENT IN OR INDEPENDENTLY (NOT BY STATE GOVERNMENT AGENT, CH.II [3.]), REPRESENTED IN, WHICH CONTINUES TO VIOLATE JUDICIAL INTEGRITY ([33.] "JUDICIAL BODY", "JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS"), OF THE PROCESS OF THE PARC REVIEW. AT [161.], "PROCEEDINGS FOR A REVIEW OF A REVIEWABLE DECISION BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER MUST BE HEARD IN PRIVATE."

THE FACT OF SUCH A JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ITS ENTIRETY IS A FRAUDULENT ACTION, AND, ENGAGING IN ~~THE~~ CONSTITUTION [1. AND 3.] VIOLATION OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION (ULTRA VIRES), BECAUSE THE OUTCOME OF SUCH REVIEW, IF PARC COMMISSIONER OVERTURNS STATE'S (PAROLE BOARD'S DECISION TO RELEASE ON PAROLE), INTENDED PAROLE RELEASE, THEN, CONSEQUENTIALLY THE PARC HAS ENGAGED IN AN ILLEGAL ACTION AGAINST THE LIFER ON MULTIPLE FRONTS.

THE PARC'S TITLE INFORMS OF ITS COMPETENT LIMITATION, AS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ONLY, SAME AS PAROLE BOARD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ONLY, SAME AS THE STATUTORY INSTRUMENT THEY BOTH EXIST WITHIN, CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ONLY, AS THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE OBLIGATION OF THE STATE TO ENFORCE THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE COURT.

AN ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW (PARC), HAS NO CRIMINAL JURISDICTION ATTACHED TO IT, THEREFORE CAN'T PROCEDURALLY BE A PARTY

TO CREATION OF A 'NPP OF TIME' AGAINST A LIFER, CAN'T DENY PAROLE RELEASE TO A LIFER WHO IS CONVICTED OF CAPITAL CRIME, WHICH HAPPENED PRIOR TO OPERATIONAL START DATE OF THE PARC, AS SUCH 'DENIED PAROLE' BY THE COMPETENT STATE BODY, MUST IMMEDIATELY EFFECT OPERATION OF [38.,

40., 44. AND 45.], AS STATE NOT JURISDICTIONALLY COMPETENT TO REFUSE SUCH PAROLE-RELEASE OF LIFER (AS DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT), THEN IF COURT REJECTS STATE'S APPLICATION TO 'EXTEND NPP', RESPECTIVE LIFER MUST BE PAROLE RELEASED, THEREFORE ALSO, EVEN IF PARC COMMISSIONER

DID NOT FIND (AS AN OFFICIAL REVIEW RULING), THAT BOARD'S 'PAROLE-RELEASE DECISION WAS LEGALLY SOUND' (HENCE NAME PURPOSE OF PARC), THE PARC HAS NO CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION (IN CH.II [3.]), TO ASSIST ~~THE~~

- DIRECTLY WITH THE CREATION OF A 'NPP OF TIME' AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFER, AND SO THE STATE GOVERNMENT MUST IMMEDIATELY EFFECT OPERATION OF [38., 40., 44. AND 45.], DUE TO THE FACT THAT CH. II [3.] HAS NO CRIMINAL JURISDICTION RE 'SENTENCING A LIFER OR ENFORCING ^{SUCH} SENTENCE AGAINST LIFER',
1246. SO THEN, IF PARC COMMISSIONER 'FINDS' LEGITIMATE LEGALITY ERROR, IT CANNOT DENY OR BE PARTY TO DENIAL OF COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE ACTUALLY BEING COMPLIED WITH, AND, WITHOUT EXTENDING LIFER'S NPP, WHICH IS ONLY DONE IN CH. III [3.] BY COMPETENT COURT, THE PARC ~~IS~~ ^{HAS NO} COMPETENT JURISDICTION
1247. TO ENABLE OPERATION OF [172.]. IF THE REASON FOR 'LEGITIMATE LEGALITY ERROR' IS DUE TO FAULT OF BOARD'S 'ADMINISTRATION NEGLECT' (OR SIMILAR, IN OTHER WORDS IT IS NOT LIFER'S ERROR), THEN ADMINISTRATIVE TIME MUST BE PROMPTLY ACTIONED TO RECTIFY 'LEGALITY ISSUE'. IF THE REASON FOR
1248. 'LEGITIMATE ~~LEGALITY~~ LEGALITY ERROR' IS DUE TO PRISONER CONDUCT, CONSIDERING A PRISONER LIFER IS NOT A LAWYER, THEN PROVIDING ISSUE IS 'NOT RELATING TO PRISONER FOUND GUILTY OF ILLEGAL/IMPROPER CONDUCT', THEN ADMINISTRATIVE TIME SHOULD BE PROMPTLY ACTIONED TO RECTIFY 'LEGALITY ISSUE'.
1249. IF LIFER IS NOT COURT SENTENCED TO COMPETENT SENTENCING STANDARDS, WHICH INCLUDE THEREIN, 'PAROLE IS FOR REST OF THEIR LIFE' ([151.]), IF THEY ARE GRANTED PAROLE BY COMPETENT STATE BODY, THEN THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF [151. AND 156.], VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF CH. II [3.], CREATING SENTENCE EFFECT WHICH ONLY HAS JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE IN A CH. III [3.] COMPETENT COURT (AND AT NO TIME CAN CH. II [3.] JURISDICTIONALLY OPERATE ANY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN STATUTE, WITH
1250. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, AGAINST ANY LIFER, WHICH EFFECTS THE CREATION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF ENFORCEMENT, OF A 'NPP OF TIME' ([SEE TEXT AT 192. IBID] "ONLY A JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT STATUS IS ABLE TO SENTENCE A PRISONER FOR MURDER..."),
1251. SO THE CH. II [3.] STATUTORY INSTRUMENT (PARC), EXCEEDS COMPETENT
1252. JURISDICTION OF CH. II [3.], EXCEEDS ITS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COMPETENT
1253. JURISDICTION, AND, UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CREATES A CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION OPERATIONAL EVENT (A NEW 'NPP OF TIME'), AND JURISDICTIONALLY FRAUDULENT

1254. IMPOSITION AUTHORITY (CLAIMED JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE (INCLUDING THE 'CERTIFICATION SIGNING-OFF FOR PAROLE-RELEASE') BY PARC COMMISSIONER)
1255. (THAT WAY MAKING PAROLE BOARD, WHO RECOMMEND PAROLE PERIOD FOR ~~THE~~ LIFE, AND PARC COMMISSIONER, WHO THEN APPROVES 'LIFE PAROLE' RECOMMENDATION, AND PARC COMMISSIONER, WHO PROCEDURALLY 'SIGNS-OFF ON THEIR (STATE GOVERNMENTS)', PARC REVIEW FROM WHICH PAROLE RELEASE IS ACTIONED BY STATE GOVERNMENT AND
1256. PRISONER THEN GETS ~~THE~~ PAROLE-RELEASED', ALL PARTY TO THE PROCESS OF ULTRA VIRES RE-SENTENCING OF RESPECTIVE LIFER TO A NEW SENTENCE, WHERE MAXIMUM PERIOD OF ~~THE~~ PAROLE WHICH FORMED COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE, WAS STATUTORY 10. YEARS ([64.]
1257. (SEE ANDREWS JUDGMENT PROPER [207.], THEREIN PARAGRAPH 20. "(3) WHERE A PRISONER WHO IS SERVING A SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT IS TO BE RELEASED ON ~~THE~~ PAROLE, THE BOARD - (A) SHALL RECOMMEND TO THE GOVERNOR THE PERIOD, BEING NOT LESS THAN THREE YEARS NOR MORE THAN TEN, FOR WHICH THE PRISONER SHOULD CONTINUE ON PAROLE; AND (B) SHALL FORWARD A COPY OF ITS RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO THE PERIOD AND CONDITIONS TO WHICH THE RELEASE ON PAROLE IS TO BE SUBJECT, TO THE GOVERNOR FOR APPROVAL." ([30.] "SHALL"),
1258. THEREIN PARAGRAPH 21. "67 (6) (A) MUST RECOMMEND TO THE GOVERNOR - (ii) A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN THREE YEARS OR MORE THAN 10 YEARS, FOR WHICH THE PRISONER SHOULD CONTINUE ON PAROLE; AND 67 (7) THE GOVERNOR... ON A DAY AND FOR A PERIOD SPECIFIED IN THE ORDER, BEING NOT LESS THAN THREE YEARS AND NOT MORE THAN TEN YEARS.")
1259. (SEE INGE JUDGMENT PROPER [50.], THEREIN PARAGRAPH 62. "... WHILST IT IS TRUE THAT PARLIAMENT IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA HAS REQUIRED THAT, IN ALL CASES INVOLVING A CONVICTION FOR MURDER, A SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT MUST BE PASSED ^{ON} ~~AT~~ THE PRISONER, THAT REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE READ IN ISOLATION. IT EXISTS WITHIN A MATRIX OF LEGISLATION... THAT STEP, IN TURN, IF THE CONDITIONS OF PAROLE ~~ARE~~ OBSERVED, CONTEMPLATES THE PROSPECT THAT AFTER

NO MORE THAN TEN YEARS NOR LESS THAN THREE YEARS ON PAROLE,
THE PRISONER'S SENTENCE, ALTHOUGH ORIGINALLY ONE OF LIFE
 IMPRISONMENT, WILL BE WHOLLY SATISFIED [78]")

1260. (SEE DCS ACT, AS REFERENCED IN 2010 VERSION [86.] (INCLUDING SIMILARLY
 WORDED VERSIONS BACK TO [46.] ON 1-8-1994), THEREIN SECTION 70 -
 DURATION OF PAROLE FOR LIFE PRISONERS "(1) A PRISONER SERVING A
 SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT WHO IS RELEASED ON PAROLE WILL, UNLESS THE
 RELEASE IS CANCELLED OR SUSPENDED, OR THE SENTENCE IS EXTINGUISHED, REMAIN
 ON PAROLE - (B) IN ANY OTHER CASE - FOR THE PERIOD RECOMMENDED BY
THE BOARD AND APPROVED BY THE GOVERNOR.

1261. (2) ON THE EXPIRY OF THE PAROLE OF A PERSON PURSUANT TO
SUBSECTION (1), THE SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT WILL, SUBJECT
TO THIS PART, BE TAKEN TO HAVE BEEN WHOLLY SATISFIED.")

1262. WHEREBY [SEE TEXT AT 1256. IBID], 'RATHER THAN SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT
PERFORM ITS CONSTITUTIONAL [1. AND 3.] FUNCTION OF ENFORCEMENT (IN AND
BY CH. II [3.] OPERATIONS), OF COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE ONLY, WITH SUCH
SENTENCE BEING CREATED AND IMPOSED BY COMPETENT COURT (IN AND BY CH. III
[3.]), AND WHERE IMPOSED SENTENCE INCLUDED MAXIMUM PAROLE
PERIOD OF 10 YEARS, INTRINSIC TO THE SENTENCING STANDARDS
WHICH FORM THE IMPOSED SENTENCE (BY THE JURISDICTIONALLY COMPETENT
CH. III [3.] COURT), 'SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), WITHOUT

1263. THE COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO DO SO (JURISDICTIONAL ERROR/FRAUD),
REFUSED TO ACTUALLY ENFORCE THE IMPOSED SENTENCE (EXAMPLE
OF SUCH CIRCUMSTANCE IS 'THEIR' REFUSAL TO ONLY APPLY MY COURT IMPOSED
JUDGMENT/SENTENCE FROM 2002 ([80., 78. AND 77.]), EFFECTIVELY RE-SENTENCING
ME TO OPERATIONAL FULL EFFECT STANDARDS [46.]), AS IS REQUIRED BY
ABSOLUTE COMPLIANCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS [SEE TEXT AT
 1264. 846, 847. IBID], UPON RESPECTIVE LIFE' AND 'ENFORCES A NEW SENTENCE
CREATED IN STATE PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.]), RATHER THAN THAT SPECIFIC
SENTENCE CREATED IN AND BY COMPETENT COURT (CH. II [3.]), WITH THE

1265. 'SAID NEW SENTENCE NOT BEING IN THE FORM OF A SENTENCING JUDGMENT, PER INDIVIDUAL SENTENCE UPON SPECIFICALLY ASSOCIATED LIFER, BUT INSTEAD, IN THE FORM OF ARBITRARY AMENDMENTS TO PAROLE APPLICATION PROCEDURES AND PROCESSES, AND ASSOCIATED STATUTES (SEE CHALLENGE TO ARBITRARY EFFECT AT SELLECK [64. (PARA. 117.)]), SO, AS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED ABOVE (AND
1266. THROUGHOUT THIS DOCUMENT [SEE TEXT FROM 1249 TO THIS POINT]), THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ILLEGALLY MANIPULATES PROCEDURES AND PROCESSES RELATING TO PAROLE APPLICATIONS, TO STEP ON THE HEAD OF CH. III [3.] COURT OF SENTENCING, USING CH. II [3.] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDICIAL BODY (PAROLE BOARD AND PARC), TO RE-SENTENCE LIFER TO A 'PAROLE PERIOD' NO LONGER CAPPED BY STATUTORY MANDATE AT 10. YEARS MAXIMUM, AS WAS RESPECTIVE SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON SUCH LIFER, BUT THEREAFTER
1267. "EXTENDING" ([38. AND 45.]), THE PENALTY OF SENTENCE LONGER THAN COMPETANT SENTENCING COURT (CH. III [3.], AND IN MY CASE [75.], SENTENCING COURT WAS THE FULL COURT), NOT HOWEVER AS AN ENFORCEMENT OF COURT'S IMPOSING AUTHORITY [SEE TEXT AT 1253-1810.], BECAUSE IT EFFECTIVELY CRAPS ON THE ABSOLUTE CONSTITUTIONAL [1. AND 3.] JURISDICTION OF CHAPTER III [1. AND 3.] TO 'COURT IMPOSE A CRIMINAL
1268. JURISDICTION SENTENCE ON A LIFER, IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA', BUT AS AN ENFORCEMENT OF PARLIAMENT'S (CH. I [3.]), AND STATE'S (CH. II [3.]), CRIMINALLY DETERMINED AND CREATED FRAUDULENT CLAIM OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE [1. AND 3.] TO SO ACT [SEE TEXT AT 846,
1269. 847. IBID.]. HOW IRONIC THOUGH, THAT IN FACT, ALTHOUGH THE CORRUPT SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WILL TRY TO DISPUTE 'THIS' POINT (AS THEY HAVE ALREADY TRIED TO DO), [1., 3., 12., 16., 23. AND 28.] ARE IDEAL TO IMPRESS THE TRUE AND VALID JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS/RESTRICTIONS OF CH. II [3.], OF PARLIAMENT OF S.A. CH. I [1. AND 3.], AND BASICALLY, SOUTH AUSTRALIAN
1270. PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT HAVE ILLEGALLY MISREPRESENTED THEIR VALID JURISDICTION (RE DEALINGS WITH LIFERS AND THEIR SENTENCES), TREATED SUCH LIMITS/RESTRICTIONS (UPON THEIR JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE), AS PERFUNCTORY, THEN,
- 1271.

1272. ABUSED PARLIAMENT AND STATE GOVERNMENT, TO EXECUTIVELY (C.3.1) PERFORM

ACTIONS WHICH JURISDICTIONALLY PROHIBITED FROM PERFORMING (E.G. USING CABINET TO REJECT LIFE'S PAROLE APPLICATION, USING PARC TO REJECT LIFE'S PAROLE APPLICATION, USING DES ACT TO RE-SENTENCE LIFE TO NEW NPP, TO NEW PP, TO NEW PENALTY OF SENTENCE ABOVE COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE, ETC.). RETURNING TO TEXT AT 1249, IBID, WHERE SENTENCING STANDARDS APPLIED BY THE SENTENCING COURT (INCLUDING FULL COURT APPEALS), TO RESPECTIVE LIFE'S IMPOSED SENTENCE, THEREIN INCLUDE APPLICATION OF TERM OF PAROLE WITH STATUTORY MAXIMUM PERIOD OF TIME, IDENTIFIED AS TEN YEARS MAXIMUM, THEN, TWO CONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS (IN PARTICULAR), MUST BE COMPLIED WITH, BEING, CONDITION ONE, SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT MUST ADMINISTATIVELY ENFORCE (CH. II C.3.1), THE SENTENCE WHICH SAID SENTENCING COURT IMPOSED, CONDITION TWO, SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT MUST NOT EXCEED, NOR ATTEMPT TO EXCEED, ITS COMPETENT JURISDICTION WHILE ADMINISTERING ITS ENFORCEMENT OF SAID IMPOSED SENTENCE [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, IBID 7.)).

1275. ON REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS TO THE PROCESS AND PROCEDURE CHANGES

TO PAROLE APPLICATIONS, BY LIFE'S IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, AND ASSOCIATIVE CLSA (C.34.1, VERSION OPERATIONAL AT 1-1-1992), SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS ATTRACTED AT RESPECTIVE TIMES SINCE 1-1-1992, THERE SEEMS TO BE A PATTERN OF CONDUCT BY STATE PARLIAMENT (CH. I C.3.1), AND STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II C.3.1), WHEREBY SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS, WHICH ARE IMPOSED UPON RESPECTIVE LIFE'S (BY SENTENCING COURTS APPLYING PROCEDURALLY PROPER AND COMPETENT SENTENCING STANDARDS, PER INDIVIDUAL SENTENCED LIFE), AND PROPER APPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (AND RIGHTS APPLICABLE PURSUANT TO RESPECTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW), HAVE BEEN FRAUDULENTLY DENIED TO THEIR OWNER (THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE), WITH PERJURATORY DISREGARD, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF PARLIAMENT THINKING THEY HAD CONSTITUTIONAL [1.1 AUTHORITY (OPEN TO THEM), AND JURISDICTION (CH. I, II, III C.3.1), TO SIMPLY CHANGE PAROLE APPLICATION REVIEW COMPETENCE (BY STATE, UNDER

CH. II [3.1], 'CHANGE PAROLE APPLICATION PROCEDURES FOR LIFERS (BY

PARLIAMENT, UNDER CH. I [3.1], WITHOUT REGARD TO ACCRUED/SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS [126.1], AND FULL OPERATIONAL EFFECT STATE (CH. II [3.1]), OBLIGATED TO ENFORCE',

CHANGE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF STATE (IN CH. II [3.1]) TO

RE-SENTENCE A LIFER USING ~~ADMINISTRATIVE~~ ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ONLY (EXTEND NRP, EXCEED 10. YEAR CAP ON PAROLE PERIOD, EXPIRE ABILITY TO WHOLLY SATISFY SENTENCE
1282. I SEE TEXT AT 1256, 1257, 1258, 1259, 1260, 1261, ~~IBID~~ 1), 'HAVE VETO ABILITY
OPEN TO IT TO SET ASIDE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE [1. AND 3.1], THEN

ARBITRARILY CREATE AND EFFECTIVELY IMPOSE A NEW CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
SENTENCE [151. AND 172.1 ABOVE EXISTING CH. III [3.1] IMPOSED SENTENCE,
AND, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF STATE (GOVERNMENT, CH. II [3.1]), ACTING
WITH PERFUNCTORY DISREGARD TO THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY [1. AND 3.1] LIMITED
AND RESTRICTED COMPETENT JURISDICTION (BY STATE, AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE (LAW
ENFORCER, PER CH. II [3.1] BUSINESS OPERATIONS OF SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT,
OF COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE ONLY [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, ~~IBID~~ 1]), 'ACTING
CONTRARY TO STATUTORY [1.1] OBLIGATION OF COMPLIANCE TO ENFORCE
NO MORE PENALTY THAN COURTS IMPOSED SENTENCE ([28.1]) (BY ILLEGALLY
ENFORCING PARLIAMENTS CREATED AND IMPOSED NEW SENTENCE (PURSUANT TO DCS ACT
ADMINISTRATIVE AMENDMENTS), SUCH AS [151.1], AND BY APPLYING FROM [46.1], THE
OPERATIONAL EFFECTS OF DCS ACT SS. 67(9), 67(10) ([107, 108, AND 109.1]), AND BY
APPLYING FROM [46.1], THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTS OF DCS ACT SS. 67(7A), 67(7B),
67(7C) ([102, 103, 104, AND 105.1]), 'ACTING CONTRARY TO STATUTORY
[113.1] OBLIGATION TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE IS SATISFIED AT ALL
PROCEEDINGS WHICH BOARD IS LINKED TO, SPECIFICALLY RELATING
TO PAROLE APPLICATION BY LIFER (WHICH WERE DENIED TO LIFER WHEN
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ILLEGALLY SAT OVER ENTIRE PAROLE APPLICATION, AND, WHEN
PARC ENGAGES HEARINGS [148.1], AND THIS CONTRARY ACTIVITY BY STATE
GOVERNMENT (WHICH THE BOARD REPRESENTS), IS IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER LIFER
EVEN REQUESTS LAWYER ATTEND SUCH HEARING, WHERE [113.1], IS WORDED IN STATUTE
AS AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT (SUBSTANTIVE, AND PROCEDURAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAWS)),

1280.

1281.

1282.

1283.

1284.

1285. AND OTHER ACTIONS DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT, WHICH IDENTIFY HOW SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, RELATING TO LIFERS, HAVE BEEN CRIMINALLY EFFECTED/ACTIONED AGAINST MANY LIFERS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, NOT ALL BUT MOST OF US, WITHOUT COMPETENT JURISDICTION, WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] CONSENT OR PERMISSION, AND RESULTING IN PROHIBITED CONSEQUENTIAL SUFFERING/INJURY UPON RESPECTIVE (AND DISCRIMINATED-AGAINST), LIFERS (INCLUDING DENIAL OF OBSERVANCE/APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIVE, PROCEDURAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS).

1286. IF ONLY THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT HAD RESTRICTED AND LIMITED, VIA THEIR ACTIONS, IN RELATION TO MATTERS CONCERNING 'LIFER PRISONERS', ONLY WHAT THE CONSTITUTION [1.] AND OTHER SUBORDINATE STATE LEGISLATION PERMITTED (YESTERDAY), AND PERMITS (TODAY), AND PERMITS (BEING DONE TOMORROW), THEN THE STATE GOVERNMENT, WITHIN THE JURISDICTIONAL REALM OF CHAPTER II [1. AND 3.], WILL ONLY PERFORM THEIR MANDATORY ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF RESPECTIVE INDIVIDUAL COURT-IMPOSED SENTENCES!

1287. 1288. ALL SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (INCLUDING AGENTS OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT), MUST ACT WITHIN THEIR JOB IN FORM (PROCEDURE), AND SUBSTANCE (INDIVIDUAL TASKS PER PROCEDURE), WHICH ARE JURISDICTIONALLY PERMITTED/COMPETENT, AS DEFINED WITHIN PARENT ACT, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE NATION OF AUSTRALIA [1.]. EVEN THOUGH STATE PARLIAMENT OPERATES 'AS' AND 'WITHIN' CH. I ([1. AND 3.]), THE STATE GOVERNMENT IS THE EMPLOYER OF THE STAFF WHO WORK THERE, AND, THE MP'S (MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT), WHO PERFORM SOME OF THEIR STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS THERE, IN PARTICULAR, PARLIAMENTARY SITTINGS. ALSO, SAPOL PROSECUTORS AND DPP CROWN PROSECUTORS, WHO PERFORM SOME OF THEIR STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS (AS PROSECUTORS), IN CH. III ([1. AND 3.]), COURT PRECINCTS, THEY ARE STILL EMPLOYEES OF ~~THE~~ THE STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [1. AND 3.]), SO THEIR EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES MUST CONFORM WITH RELEVANT STATE LEGISLATED PERMISSIBLE, JURISDICTIONALLY COMPETENT CONDUCT. THE SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT STATE GOVERNMENT STAFF, WITHIN THE SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE CONDUCT, AS DEFINED BY THEIR EMPLOYMENT

- position, MUST ONLY do THAT WHICH THE CONSTITUTION [1.] PERMITS
- THEM TO DO, AND MUST NOT DO THAT WHICH THEY ARE NOT JURISDICTIONALLY
- COMPETENT TO DO. EXAMPLES OF REALM CHAPTER (1., AND 3.)
1292. JURISDICTIONAL FRAUD AND/OR INCOMPETENCE (ULTRA VIRES CONDUCT [82. AND 83.]), INCLUDE, SA PAROLE BOARD AND STATE GOVERNMENT RE-SENTENCING ME AND REFUSING ANY OPERATION OF 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS [80.], TO THEIR CURRENT ENFORCEMENT OF A SENTENCE AGAINST ME, AND, STATE PARLIAMENT VOTING IN, STATE AMENDMENTS WHICH CLAIM RIGHT OF OPERATION UPON CABINET [102., 103., 104. AND 105.], IN CONTRADICTION TO EXISTING SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS ALSO IN STATUTE, AND ARBITRARILY UPON/AGAINST ALL CURRENT LIFEES IN CUSTODY, AND WITHOUT OPERATION OF SENTENCING ACT OR A COURT, AND IN BREACH OF [28.], AND, PAROLE BOARD RESENTENCING LIFEER TO A NEW NPP [107., 108. AND 109.], AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT USED [82.] TO CREATE NPP AGAINST A LIFEER [107., 108. AND 109.], AND CREATE A NEW PAROLE PERIOD MAXIMUM AGAINST ALREADY SENTENCED LIFEERS LIKE ME [80.], [72., 73., 77., 78., 79. AND 80.], NO LONGER CAPPED AT 10 YEARS AS 'LIFE OF PRISONER' IS NEW MAXIMUM [151.], AND WITHOUT OPERATION OF SENTENCING ACT [38.] OR A COURT [3.].
1296. At some point in time, close to 1-8-1994, a STATE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE, OR IN COMPANY WITH ~~OTHERS~~, MADE A FORMAL OPERATIONAL DECISION, SPECIFICALLY RELATING TO 'WHAT SOUTH AUSTRALIAN PAROLE BOARD JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE IS LIMITED/RESTRICTED TO, WITHIN CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT, SA OPERATION, AFTER 1-8-1994 [46.], CONSEQUENTIAL TO OPERATIONAL START OF [46.], AND WITH SPECIFIC REGARD TO LIFEERS APPLYING FOR PAROLE RELEASE ([94., 100. AND 101.])? At some point THAT QUESTION MUST HAVE BEEN ANSWERED BY MINISTER FOR CORRECTIONAL ~~SERVICES~~, EVEN IF ONLY A FLOW-ON ANSWER FROM CROWN-SOLICITORS' OFFICE AND/OR ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S OFFICE, THEREAFTER GIVING THE FALSE BELIEF TO THE PAROLE BOARD, THAT THEY NEED NOT BOTHER WITH PREVIOUS STATUTORY OBLIGATION (IF NOT WANTING TO PAROLE-RELEASE A LIFEER), TO APPLY TO A COURT [38. AND 45.], AS THE BOARD COULD THEN- AFTER GOVERN. ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP OF LIFEER'S EXISTING (COURT IMPOSED),
1297. 101.]?
- 1298.

SENTENCE WITHOUT NEED OR USE OF ANY SENTENCING COURT (CH, III [3.1]),
SIMPLY BY OPERATING AND APPLYING EXISTING (GROUP 2, PROCESSES AND
PROCEDURES [SEE TEXT AT 1163, 1510 [107, 108, AND 109, (DCS ACT, SS. 67(9),
67(10)]]], PAROLE APPLICATION PROCEDURES FOR NON-LIFERS, AGAINST
LIFERS ALSO (GROUP 3, PRISONERS [SEE TEXT AT 1164, 1510, 1511]).^{1300.} ADDITIONALLY,
THERE MUST ALSO HAVE BEEN FORMAL NOTIFICATION PRESENTED TO THE PAROLE
BOARD, WHICH CAUSED THE BOARD TO BELIEVE (ALBEIT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY),
THAT THE BOARD COULD FORWARD ENTIRE PAROLE APPLICATION BY LIFER, TO
THE GOVERNOR, KNOWING ^{THAT} GOVERNOR WOULD ALSO BELIEVE THEY HAD
COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO SET ASIDE/REJECT BOARD'S PAROLE-RELEASE
RECOMMENDATION, THEN DENY ENTIRE PAROLE APPLICATION FROM LIFER, AND,
NOT JUST 'BOARD' OR 'BOARD-THEN-GOVERNOR' (THINKING THEY HAD LEGAL
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO REFUSE OUTHGHT, ON BEHALF OF SOUTH AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT, PAROLE RELEASE OF ~~LIFER~~ APPLICANT), PER OPERATION OF DCS ACT.
SS. 67(6) "THE BOARD MAY" THEN 67(9) [100, 107, AND 108.]^{1301.} OR
SS. 67(6) "THE BOARD MAY" AND IF THE BOARD SO RECOMMENDS, ... THEN 67(7)
THEN 67(9) [100, 101, 107, AND 108.], BUT ALSO, THAT BOTH ENTITIES (THE
PAROLE BOARD AND EXECUTIVE STATE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA), HAD LEGAL
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO CREATE A NEW NPP DATE, NEW NPP OF TIME, AND
COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO IMPOSE SAME, AND COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE SAME,
AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFER DENIED PAROLE-RELEASE (WHICH INCLUDES GOVERNOR [29.]
BEING IN SOME SORT OF CONTRIBUTORY ROLE TO THE NEW FAKE SENTENCE),
AND EVEN MORE INCREDIBLE STILL, THAT RESPECTIVE LIFER APPLICANT WHO WAS
DENIED PAROLE RELEASE, COULD THEN CONTINUE TO BE RE-SENTENCED BY THE
PAROLE BOARD WANTS TO (CONSEQUENTIAL TO FURTHER PAROLE-RELEASE
SUBMISSIONS/APPLICATIONS BY ALREADY REJECTED PAROLE APPLICANT), PER DCS ACT
SS. 67(9), 67(10) [107, 108, AND 109.], BASICALLY UNTIL THE RESPECTIVE LIFER

1399.

1300.

1301.

1302.

1303.

1304.

DIES IN CUSTODY, THEREBY EFFECTING NOT ENFORCEMENT OF COURT'S SENTENCE, BUT IN FACT
'ENFORCEMENT OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT'S FAKE SENTENCES (AS CREATED, IMPOSED AND
'ENFORCED BY PAROLE BOARD)', WITHIN CH. II [1. AND 3.], WITH 'SUGGESTED AND
CLAIMED JUSTIFIABLE, JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO SO ACT (AGAINST RESPECTIVE
LIFER APPLICANT SEEKING AND PROPERLY APPLYING FOR PAROLE-RELEASE)', YET SUCH
CLAIMED JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE IS CRIMINALLY FALSE, CRIMINALLY
MISLEADING AND JURISDICTIONALLY FRAUDULENT [1. AND 3.]'.

1305.

IT IS VERY SIMPLE TO IDENTIFY IF CH. II [3.] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

JURISDICTION, HAS OPEN TO IT, TO OPERATE THE CLSA [38. AND 45.], TO CREATE
AN OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE SENTENCE (NPP IS PART OF A LIFER'S SENTENCE), AGAINST

1306.

A LIFER ? THE CONSTITUTIONALLY ([1., 3., 38. AND 45.]), FACTUAL ANSWER

IS 'NO'!!! THEREFORE, THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NO COMPETENT
JURISDICTION OPEN TO IT, IN CH. II [3.], TO DENY ME PAROLE RELEASE BY ANY
OPERATION OF ANY PART OF THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT, SA, PER ANY VERSION
OF THAT PRINCIPAL ACT WHICH WAS OPERATIONAL WHEN I WAS SENTENCED IN 2002
[74., 77., 79., 78. AND 80.], OR ANY VERSION OF THAT PRINCIPAL ACT OPERATIONAL
IN 1992 [207. (PARA. 20. OF JUDGMENT PROPER)], OR ANY VERSION OF THAT PRINCIPAL
ACT OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATELY AFTER 1-8-1994 [46. AND 207. (PARA 21. OF
JUDGMENT PROPER)], CONSEQUENTIAL TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ([1. AND 3.]), RESTRICTIONS
ENVELOPING COMPETENT OPERATION OF CHAPTER II [3.] ACTIONS BY THE

1307.

STATE GOVERNMENT. THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT [85.],
HAS OPEN TO IT ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JURISDICTION, NOT CRIMINAL LAW
JURISDICTION, WHICH IS WHY THE CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING) ACT 1988, SA.
[84.], EVEN EXISTS, BECAUSE THE CREATION/AMENDING OF A SOUTH AUSTRALIAN
LIFER'S SENTENCE IS JUDICIALLY ACTIONED, BY A COMPETENT COURT [44.], BY
OPERATION OF COMPETENT STATUTE [45.] (SECTION 56(1), IS ABSOLUTE IN ITS VERY
SPECIFIC WORDING), AND FOR ADDITIONAL CLARITY AND QUALIFICATION [38.] ~~HEADING~~
HEADING LEAVES NO ROOM FOR MISINTERPRETATION, "DUTY OF COURT TO FIX OR
EXTEND NON-PAROLE PERIODS".

1308.

THE MAGIC TRICK PERFORMED BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, REGARDING THE

MOVING OF LIFER'S 'NPP DATE' (CONSEQUENTIAL TO OPERATION AND APPLICATION OF DCS Act s. 67(9) [107. AND 108.], ESPECIALLY s. 67(9)(c)), IS THAT 'ON ONE HAND THEY INFORM AND NOTIFY LIFER (WHO HAD THEIR PAROLE APPLICATION REFUSED BY AGENTS OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT, WORKING AND OPERATING ONLY WITHIN CH. II [3.]), THAT THEIR NEXT EARLIEST NPP DATE MINUS 6 MONTHS BEING A SPECIFIED DATE IN THE FUTURE, BEFORE WHICH BOARD WILL NOT ACCEPT ANOTHER PAROLE APPLICATION, PER DCS Act. s. 67(9)(c)', HOWEVER, 'STATE GOVERNMENT HAS NO JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO MAKE A NEW NPP DATE AGAINST SAID LIFER' (SUCH AS ME, OR ANDREWS [207.], OR WATSON [194.], OR G. REARDON (DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT, CRIME HAPPENED 1993, TRIAL AND CONVICTION LATE 1994, SENTENCING IN 1995 PER [46.] SENTENCING STANDARDS, RATHER THAN 1993 SENTENCING STANDARDS)), THAT THEN ALSO CREATES A PERIOD OF TIME UP TO SUCH NEW NPP DATE, WHICH IS THEN A NEW NPP OF TIME INTRINSIC TO SAID NEW NPP DATE, THE REASON INCLUDING CH. II [3.] DOES NOT PERMIT EXTENDING DATE OF COURT IMPOSED NPP (WHICH IS NPP DATE, NPP OF TIME), EXCEPT IN AND BY ANOTHER COMPETENT COURT IN CH. III [3.], AND, IN FACT THEIR TRUE NPP DATE (BY COURT IMPOSITION), IS STILL AS IT WAS WHEN IMPOSED BY SENTENCING COURT..... THAT'S THE MAGIC TRICK..... THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND ITS AGENTS LIED TO RESPECTIVE LIFER (WHO HAS THEIR ACTIVE PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION DENIED/REFUSED BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT), 'BY WAY OF FALSE REPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITY TO EVEN APPLY DCS Act. s. 67(9) AGAINST LIFER, RATHER THAN STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO SEEK COURT'S AMENDMENT TO EXISTING NPP [38. AND 45.]. THAT IS WHAT I'VE DESCRIBED (IN PART), THROUGHOUT THIS DOCUMENT AS A 'FAKE SENTENCE', AS THE APPLICATION OF DCS Act s. 67(9) [107. AND 108.], HAS NO LEGITIMATE LEGAL BASIS UPON WHICH IT COULD BE LAWFULLY APPLIED TO A LIFER, SUCH AS ME, PER SENTENCING STANDARDS IMPOSED UPON ME IN 2002 [74.], WHICH INCLUDED THE MANDATORY STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE OPERATION OF [38.], IF, SUBSEQUENT TO FORMAL DOCUMENTED APPLICATION BY ME, TO BE PAROLE-RELEASED (PURSUANT TO SET DUE PROCESS AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 20. IN ANDREWS [207.]), THE STATE

GOVERNMENT DID NOT WANT TO PAROLE-RELEASE ME AT SUCH TIME, THEY HAD NO CHOICE, THEY HAD NO DISCRETION, THEY HAD NO OPTION, THEY WOULD BE STATUTE OBLIGATED, [37. (B) CAUSE AN EXPLANATION OF THE LEGAL EFFECT AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE SENTENCE..."] TO APPLY TO THE COMPETENT COURT ([38.1], AND IF THE COURT DENIED SUCH APPLICATION BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT,

1316. THEN MY PAROLE-RELEASE MUST BE PROMPTLY ACTIONED. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ANDREWS [207.], AND WATSON [194.], BOTH APPLIED FOR PAROLE-RELEASE

MULTIPLE TIMES, DUE TO STATE GOVERNMENT ILLEGALLY APPLYING PCS Act s. 67(9) [107. AND 108.], AGAINST THEM, YET STATE WAS MANDATED TO ONLY

1317. ENGAGE CLSA, s. 32 PER. s. 56 [38. 40. 44. AND 45.]. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCE

OF ME [74.], AS AT MAY 2017, I STILL CAN'T LAWFULLY APPLY FOR PAROLE-RELEASE DUE TO CURRENT AMENDMENTS TO CORRECTIONAL SERVICES Act, SA, WHICH INCLUDE ABOVE HIGHLIGHTED 'PARC' AND 'LIFE ON PAROLE', BOTH OF WHICH ARE ILLEGALLY

ASSENTED INTO STATUTE, AND ADDITIONALLY, MY COURT'S SENTENCE [74.] DOES NOT PERMIT ANYMORE THAN 10 YEARS ON PAROLE, AS PAROLE-MAXIMUM WAS STATUTE

1318. CAPPED. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF REARDON (DESCRIBED IN MORE DETAIL THROUGHOUT THIS DOCUMENT), REARDON'S 1995 SENTENCES (ROBBEN, WILDER), WERE FOR 1993

CRIMES, THEREFORE, OPERATIONALLY SAME SENTENCING STANDARDS AS IMPOSED UPON HE IN 2002 ([74. 77. 78. 79. AND 80.]), ARE STILL JUDICIALLY REQUIRED TO BE IMPOSED UPON REARDON'S CURRENT 1995 SENTENCES (SEE ANDREWS JUDGMENT

PROPER [207. (PARA. 20.1)], AND THAT INVITES MY COMPLAINT RE 'PARC' AND 'LIFE ON PAROLE', PLUS, EVEN THE 1995 ([46.1]) SENTENCING STANDARDS WHICH WERE IMPOSED UPON REARDON IN 1995, WOULD STILL INVITE MY COMPLAINT RE 'PARC'

AND 'LIFE ON PAROLE' (AS PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.1]), HAS NO COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO VOTE-IN STATUTE AMENDMENTS [82. AND 83.], WHICH EFFECT OPERATIONALLY, AN

INCREASE IN PENALTY OF SENTENCE WHICH THE COURT IMPOSED ONTO/UPON RESPECTIVE CONVICTED PERSON, AND STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.1]), HAS NO COMPETENT

JURISDICTION TO APPLY/ENFORCE ANY INCREASE IN PENALTY OF SENTENCE ABOVE THAT

WHICH WAS IMPOSED UPON REARDON BY THE SENTENCING COURT (CH. III [3.1]), PLUS, WHEN A COMPETENT SENTENCING COURT EVENTUALLY DETERMINES, AND THEN

IMPOSES THE CORRECT SENTENCING STANDARDS UPON REARDON,⁶ FOLLOWING HIS RESPECTIVE 1994 CONVICTIONS (FOR 1993 CRIMES),⁹ SUCH A COMPETENT COURT WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE OPEN TO IT, OTHER THAN TO FOLLOW THE FOUNDATION PLATFORM DESCRIBED IN MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74., 77., 78., 80. AND 72.].

1319. IT EASILY BECOMES CLEAR, WHEN TRYING TO UNDERSTAND/COMPREHEND HOW SUCH DEGREE/EXTENT OF JURISDICTIONAL FRAUD, COULD BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN FOR SO LONG IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, REGARDING MATTERS IDENTIFIED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT, THE ANSWER IS.... BECAUSE PEOPLE DID NOT DO THEIR JOBS

1320. ACCURATELY, HONESTLY OR COMPETENTLY!!! FROM THE 'ATTORNEY-GENERAL PRESENTING GOVERNMENT'S BILL (ASSENTED TO [46.]), IN 1994 DURING WHICH STATUTORY ([1. AND 3. (CH. I)]), MIRAGES (LIES/MISREPRESENTATIONS), WERE TOLD TO PARLIAMENT, TO 'UNCONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS BEING MADE BY EXECUTIVE

1321. GOVERNMENT RELATING TO LIFERS [29., 102., 103., 104., 105., 106., 107., 108., 109. AND 113. (REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH RE CABINET HEARINGS [29.])], AND BY BOARD (RE PAROLE APPLICATION ACCRUED RIGHTS OF LIFERS), TO 'THE INCREDIBLE FALSE REPRESENTATIONS BY CROWN LAWYER (ON BEHALF OF SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT), IN THE WATSON JUDICIAL REVIEW [194.], ABOUT THE CLAIMED

1322. JURISDICTIONAL AND STATUTORY COMPETENCES OF THE S.A. GOVERNMENT, RELATING TO LIFERS AND THEIR SENTENCING RIGHTS, TO 'THE JUDGES ON THE BENCH IN SAME WATSON JUDICIAL REVIEW ([194.]), WHO "FUNDAMENTALLY AND RADICALLY" (WILDE V. THE QUEEN [1988] HCA 6.), FAILED AND NEGLECTED TO COMPETENTLY INVESTIGATE THE TRUE AND ACCURATE RELEVANT STATUTORY JURISDICTION, WHICH WAS APPLICABLE TO WATSON AS A LIFER SEEKING PAROLE-RELEASE ([208. (ACCRUED AND SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS AND WHEN AND HOW AND BY WHOM ENFORCEABLE)]), AS FURTHER PARTICULARISED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT'.

1324. IT IS WITH PERFUNCTORY IRONY, THAT, THOSE WITH THE STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO CREATE (AND OVERSEE APPLICATION OF WITHIN THE COMMUNITY), STATUTORY BOUNDARIES 'WITHIN WHICH LIFERS MUST CONDUCT THEMSELVES AND THEIR 'DUE PROCESSES', RELATING TO JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE (AND RESPECTIVE NON- PAROLE PERIOD), THEMSELVES ACT ^{IN} SUCH

AN IMPROPER, ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER ([1.7]), AS DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT WHERE BILLS ARE ASSSENTED INTO STATUTE, THAT ARE CONSTITUTION-ALLY PROHIBITED [1.7], FROM EVEN BEING CREATED, THEN OPERATED/IMPOSED AND ENFORCED AGAINST CERTAIN LIFERS (LIKE ME, AS I HAVE DESCRIBED THROUGHOUT THIS DOCUMENT, THE STATES [3.1] ILLEGAL USE OF CH.II AUTHORITY, TO ACT OUT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION AGAINST ME AS AN INDIVIDUAL PRISONER ([79.7]), EVEN THOUGH ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.7] PERMITTED TO ACT INSIDE OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION), AS DESCRIBED HEREIN, PARTICULARLY CONDUCT WHICH IS ULTRA VIRES, JURISDICTIONALLY FRAUDULENT, CONSEQUENTLY ILLEGAL "HARM" (CICA [31.7]), BEING SUFFERED BY THOSE LIFERS, INCLUDING ME), CREATING PASSAGE OF BILLS IN PARLIAMENT [3.1] (CH.I), OPERATING, APPLYING AND ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTORY AMENDMENTS BORNE FROM SUCH BILLS BY STATE GOVERNMENT [3.1] (CH.II), EVEN THOUGH COMPETENT PARENT STATUTE, INCLUDING [1.7] AND [28.7], PROHIBITED CREATION (OR FOR CERTAIN AMENDMENTS WHICH MIGHT HAVE PROPERLY BEEN ASSSENTED, BUT WHICH WERE NOT COMPETENTLY APPLIED TO ME, AS DESCRIBED THROUGHOUT THIS DOCUMENT IN FURTHER DETAILED PARTICULARISATION), OF SUCH AMENDMENTS FROM EXISTING, BUT WERE CREATED AND OPERATED BECAUSE (AND INDEPENDENTLY OF EACH OTHER), SA PARLIAMENT AND SA GOVERNMENT DID NOT LIMIT/RESTRICT THEIR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES (PARLIAMENT SITTING BUSINESS, AND STATE GOVERNMENT PRISONER ADMINISTRATION BUSINESS), TO ONLY SUCH ACTIVITIES THEY WERE JURISDICTIONALLY COMPETENT (PERMITTED), TO ENGAGE IN (EXAMPLE, IF PAROLE-RELEASE OF LIFER APPLICANT IS NOT THE DECISION OF BOARD [94.7],

Section 32, CLSA [84, 45, 34, 35, 38, 40, AND 44.7], MUST BE EFFECTED AS A STATUTORY OBLIGATION UPON SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, "THE PROCESS ACCORDING TO LAW", BUT INSTEAD OF PROCESS PER [38.7], STATE GOVERNMENT, AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFER APPLICANT (LIKE IT DID WITH ANDREWS [207.7] AND WATSON [194.7]), BY ACTION OF JURISDICTIONAL FRAUD/INCOMPETENCE/ERROR [82. AND 83.7], APPLIED DCS Act ss. 67(9) AND 67(10) [107, 108, AND 109.7], AGAINST SUCH LIFERS).

1329. IF THE GROUP 3. LIFERS [SEE TEXT AT 1164. 181D], HAD BEEN MANAGED BY THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT [85.], PURSUANT TO ALL RELEVANT AND PROPER (LAWFULLY ASSENTED RELATED BILL PROPOSALS), WITH REGARD TO LIFERS APPLYING TO THE BOARD FOR PAROLE-RELEASE, AND, SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT NOT WANTING TO RELEASE LIFER YET, AND, STATE HAD APPLIED TO COURT TO EXTEND NPP [38., 40., 44. AND 45.], THEN, IT SHOULD BE FAIRLY EASY TO FIND OUT FROM SA COURT REGISTRY, HOW MANY APPLICATIONS WERE MADE TO THE COURT, BY THE STATE, PURSUANT TO CLSA s. 32 [38.], 'TO EXTEND NPP OF LIFER WHO HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED THEIR PAROLE APPLICATION, BETWEEN 1-8-1994 AND 15-6-2017 (WHERE BOARD RECEIVES
1330. RESPECTIVE APPLICATIONS BETWEEN SAID STIPULATED DATES)? I SUSPECT THE ANSWER 'TO BE A VERY LOW NUMBER, CONSIDERING (AS I HAVE HIGHLIGHTED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT), THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT. REPEATEDLY ABUSED ITS CHAPTER II [3.] AUTHORITY (SPECIFICALLY REGARDING LIFER-APPLICANTS
1331. [94.]), AND INSTEAD OF ACTIONING [38. AND 40.], AS IT WAS OBLIGATED
1332. TO DO, IT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ACTIONED DCS Act ss. 67(9) AND 67(10) [107., 108. AND 109.], TO 'ILLEGALLY DENY PAROLE RELEASE TO LIFER, BY JURISDICTIONALLY FRAUDULENT APPLICATION OF PROHIBITED SECTIONS OF
1333. DCS Act [85.]', AND THEN, 'ILLEGALLY ^{CREATE} ~~CREATE~~, IMPOSE AND ENFORCE (DCS Act s. 67(9) [107.], A FAKE SENTENCE AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFER (DCS Act s. 67(9)(c) [108.]), BY JURISDICTIONALLY FRAUDULENT AND ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF PROHIBITED SECTIONS OF DCS Act [85.], CONSEQUENTING
1334. ALSO, 'THE ACTUAL EFFECT OF 'A POLITICAL PRISONER'', BASICALLY, AN INCARCERATED LIFER WHO WAS STILL IN PRISON BECAUSE OF AN ILLEGALLY ACTIONED DECISION, MADE BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS AGENTS (OF CORRUPTION)'.
SECTION 32, OF THE SENTENCING ACT [84. AND 38.], EXISTS BECAUSE IT MUST
1335. EXIST. WITHOUT THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF S. 32 [38.], SPECIFICALLY REGARDING
1336. 'EXTENDING NPP OF LIFERS', THEN A LIFER'S NPP COULD NOT BE 'EXTENDED' BY WAY OF ANY APPLICATION BY STATE GOVERNMENT, AS SUCH WOULD NOT ~~BE~~ HAVE THE PREREQUISITE STATUTORY DUE PROCESS TO SO OPERATE... NO ~~BE~~ WORDS

IN STATUTE MEANS NO POWER, NO AUTHORITY AND NO JURISDICTION IN STATUTE!!!

1337.

IT IS ACTUALLY VERY SIMPLE TO DETERMINE IF SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS INTENDED ACTION (SUCH AS TO CREATE A 'NPP OF TIME' AND 'THEN IMPOSE IT' UPON ANY LIFER, TO DO SO AFTER REFUSING TO RELEASE LIFER ON PAROLE, TO EVEN REFUSE PAROLE TO A LIFER BY ACTION OF CSA [85.] ALONE, TO 'INCREASE PENALTY OF IMPOSED SENTENCE FROM 10 YEARS TO REST OF LIFER'S LIFE (NOT BY SENTENCING COURT, BUT BY RECENT AMENDMENT TO CSA [85.])', TO 'DECIDE NOT TO COMPLY WITH [45. AND 38.] STATUTORY OBLIGATION (BUT TO CREATE NPP INCREASE WITHOUT EVEN USING A JUDGE OR A CRIMINAL JURISDICTION COURT, OR THE SENTENCING ACT' [86.])', IS EVEN

1338.

PERMITTED COMPETENTLY BY OPERATION OF CSA [85.]? THE ANSWER TO THOSE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, RE COMPETENCE, IS 'NO' (FOR REASONS IDENTIFIED WITHIN

1339.

THIS DOCUMENT). AS WAS APTLY DESCRIBED AND EXPLAINED IN [210.], A 2016 JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, 'JURISDICTION' IS THE ENVIRONMENT WITHIN WHICH ACTIONS ARE DONE, AND 'POWER' IS THE RESPECTIVE AUTHORITY TO

1340.

OPERATE WITHIN SUCH JURISDICTION. IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT THE FOLLOWING TEXT BE READ PER ITS PURPOSE, AND NOT AS PERFUNCTORY RECITATION:

(QUOTE FROM [210.], PARA. 68.)

1341.

"INHERENT JURISDICTION UNDERSTOOD NOT AS AUTHORITY TO ADJUDICATE, BUT AS INHERENT POWER, MAY BE DEPLOYED IN THE EXERCISE OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION CONFERRED ON SUPREME COURTS PURSUANT TO S 39(2) OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OR SOME OTHER COMMONWEALTH LAW ⁸⁵. AS TOOHEY J SAID IN HARRIS V CALADINE ⁸⁶ IN A PASSAGE REPEATEDLY QUOTED IN THIS COURT:

1342.

"THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN JURISDICTION AND POWER IS OFTEN BLURRED, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF 'INHERENT JURISDICTION'. BUT THE DISTINCTION MAY AT TIMES BE IMPORTANT. JURISDICTION IS THE AUTHORITY WHICH A COURT HAS TO DECIDE THE RANGE OF MATTERS THAT CAN BE LITIGATED BEFORE IT; IN THE EXERCISE OF THAT JURISDICTION A COURT HAS POWERS EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY CONFERRED BY THE LEGISLATION GOVERNING THE COURT AND SUCH POWERS AS ARE INCIDENTAL AND NECESSARY TO THE EXERCISE OF THE JURISDICTION OR THE POWERS SO CONFERRED. (CITATIONS OMITTED)"

1343.

IF MY COMPLAINT AGAINST SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT (THEY BOTH ENGAGED IN PROCESSES, AND ARRIVED AT OUTCOMES (FORMAL DETERMINATIONS), AND CONSEQUENTIALLY EFFECTED OPERATIONAL CHANGES, SPECIFICALLY RELATING TO LIFERS AND PAROLE APPLICATIONS OF LIFERS), WAS TO BE HONESTLY INVESTIGATED BY SAME, OR OTHERWISE BY DELEGATE ON BEHALF OF SAME, THEN, THE REALISATION MUST FOLLOW THAT BOTH THE STATE PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.1]), AND STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.1]), HAVE ACTED/OPERATED OUTSIDE THEIR PERMITTED AUTHORITY, OUTSIDE THEIR INHERENT AUTHORITY, OUTSIDE THEIR COMPETENT JURISDICTION, AND ACHIEVED OUTCOMES WHICH, UPON COMPETENT INVESTIGATION OF THEIR ACTIONS AND OUTCOMES ACHIEVED, BEEN ACHIEVED FRAUDULENTLY AND/OR NEGLIGENTLY ILLEGALLY, AND MOST CERTAINLY UNCONSTITUTIONALLY [1. AND 3.], AS DESCRIP~~TIVELY~~ PARTICULARISED THROUGHOUT THIS DOCUMENT.

1344.

IT COMES BACK TO LACKING 'JURISDICTION TO OPERATE', AND EVEN WHEN THE REQUIRED JURISDICTIONAL ENVIRONMENT WAS COMPETENTLY OPEN TO USE (BY THE RESPECTIVE BODY (EXAMPLE, HOUSE OF REPS. VOTING ON A BILL (CH. I [3.1]), GOVERNOR ASSENTING A BILL ([15.1]), CABINET DECIDING BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS RE LIFER PAROLE-RELEASE (DCS ACT S. 67(7) [101.1])), ITS USE WAS ERRONEOUSLY/UNCONSTITUTIONALLY USED IN A WAY WHICH INVALIDATED ITS EXISTING JURISDICTION, SUCH AS LACKING AUTHORITY TO ACTION ~~SOMETHING~~ SOMETHING ACHIEVED, AND BY LACKING AUTHORITY, BUT STILL ACTING AS IF HAD REQUIRED AUTHORITY, AUTOMATICALLY 'CONSEQUENTING REVOCATION OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION', BUT YET STILL OPERATING AS IF STILL HELD AUTHORITY (TO ACT), WITHIN SUCH JURISDICTIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION, AND STILL OPERATING AS IF STILL HELD COMPETENCE TO EXIST AND CONSIDER MATTERS (THE JURISDICTION "WHICH A [COURT] HAS TO DECIDE THE RANGE OF MATTERS THAT CAN BE LITIGATED BEFORE IT." [SEE TEXT 'QUOTE' AT 1342, IBID.])).

1345.

IT IS ONE THING TO HOLD COMPETENT JURISDICTION, THEN TO HOLD COMPETENT AUTHORITY ('JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY'), WITHIN ~~SAY~~ SAID JURISDICTION, UNTIL, 'SAID AUTHORITY (TO SO ACT), IS VOIDED DUE TO A SPECIFIC ACT BEING DONE, WHICH IS OUTSIDE THE PERMISSIBLE MATTER/S OF SAID JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY, AND IS THEREFORE ULTRA VIRES'.

1346. IF THE ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCE [SEE TEXT AT 1345, IBID], WAS APPLIED TO THE ACTIONS OF THE PAROLE BOARD (ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT), CONCERNING 'BOARD'S USE OF JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY WHICH IT VALIDLY HOLDS, THEN OPERATES AGAINST GROUP 2 PRISONERS' (WHO APPLY FOR PAROLE-RELEASE, BUT THE BOARD DETERMINES NOT TO GRANT PAROLE, THEN ACTIONS
1347. DCS ACT. SS 67(9), 67(9)(A), 67(9)(B), 67(9)(C), 67(10) [107., 108. AND 109.], AFTER BOARD "REFUSES" (DCS S. 67(9)(A))), WHICH WOULD OPERATIONALLY EFFECT AND ENABLE COMPETENCE IN THE BOARD (AS THE BOARD WOULD BE ENGAGING IN MATTERS IT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED TO (PAROLE DENIED, RE-APPLY IN A FEW MONTHS, DCS ACT SS. 67(9)(A), 67(9)(C))), THEN THE OPERATIONS OF THE BOARD WOULD NOT BE INCOMPETENT, WOULD NOT BE ULTRA VIRES,
1348. HOWEVER, WHEN BOARD RECEIVES FROM A GROUP 3. PRISONER [SEE TEXT AT 1164, IBID], A LIKE APPLICATION FOR PAROLE-RELEASE (AT WHICH POINT THE BOARD IS ACTING WITH JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE [94.]), THEN, PER COMPETENT DUE PROCESSING OF SAID APPLICATION BY GROUP 3. PRISONER, THE BOARD'S PROCESSING
1349. REACHES THE POINT OF OPERATION OF DCS ACT S. 67(6) [100.] (AT WHICH POINT THE BOARD IS STILL ACTING WITH JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, AND COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY), BUT, DEPENDING ON WHAT ACTIONS ARE THEREAFTER
1350. ENGAGED, CONCERNING SAID LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION, QUALIFIABLY DETERMINES CONTINUING OPERATIONAL VIABILITY OF EXISTING JURIDITION, AND EXISTING AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD (AND OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT ALSO, AS THE BOARD'S REPRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF STATE GOVERNMENT (REGARDING LIFER'S SEEKING ^{OF} PAROLE RELEASE, SUCH AS MYSELF [74.], WATSON [194.], AND ANDREWS [207.]), MEANS THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE BOARD, ARE IN FACT THE ACTIONS OF THE STATE (CH. II [3.]), SO THAT IF THE ACTIONS OF THE BOARD ARE JUDICIALLY RULED TO BE ILLEGAL AND INVALID (UNCONSTITUTIONAL), THEN, CONSEQUENTIALLY, IT MUST STAND AS UNDENIABLE PROOF, THAT THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS
1351. ACTED UNCONSTITUTIONALLY [1.]), SO, IF LIFER APPLICANT WAS SENTENCED COMPETENTLY TO CORRECT SENTENCING STANDARDS, AND SUCH WERE CONSISTENT WITH THOSE OF ME [74., 77., 79. AND 80.], AND MY PROPER RE-SENTENCING IN 2002

1352. [74.], THEREIN RE-ESTABLISHING AND FORTIFYING LAWFULLY APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF 1992 [80.] (AND CONSISTENT WITH SAME ORIGINAL SENTENCING STANDARDS OF WATSON [194.], AND ANDREWS [207.], WHICH HELD THAT 'UPON REACHING THE NPP DATE PLUS THIRTY MORE DAYS, LIFER PAROLE APPLICANT MUST BE PAROLE RELEASED [126.]'), AND COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY [SEE TEXT AT 1349. IBID.],
1353. IS TO VALIDLY CONTINUE, THEN, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, THERE EXIST ONLY TWO JURISDICTIONALLY COMPETENT AND JURISDICTIONALLY AUTHORISED PATHS OPEN TO THE BOARD, UPON DUE PROCESS ARRIVAL OF LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION AT THE FOOT OF DCS Act s. 67(6) [100.] (FOR LIFERS SENTENCED COMPETENTLY TO SENTENCING STANDARDS EXISTING IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO 1-8-1994 [46.]), BEING EITHER :
1354. PATH. A, CONTINUE BOARD'S JURISDICTIONAL PROCESSING OF PAROLE APPLICATION BY LIFER (WHICH ALSO MANDATES ONLY ONE CONSTITUTIONALLY VIABLE AND PERMITTED OUTCOME, AND THAT IS PAROLE MUST BE GRANTED,
1355. AND THEREFORE IS NO LONGER OPEN TO THE BOARD TO EFFECT ANY OTHER DECISION (THE ALTERNATIVE BEING REJECT PAROLE APPLICATION FROM LIFER, WHICH IS NOT JURISDICTIONALLY OPEN TO BOARD ANYWAY, AGAINST A LIFER, SENTENCED AS ANDREWS [207.], WATSON [194.], AND I WERE [74.]), OTHER THAN PAROLE-RELEASE, BUT WHAT CONTINUES OPEN TO THE BOARD (AND ARE THE ONLY MATTERS WHICH REMAIN JURISDICTIONALLY OPEN AND AUTHORISED FOR BOARD TO DETERMINE (RECOMMEND TWO SPECIFIC CONDITIONS, AT DCS Act. ss. 67(6)(A)(i), AND 67(6)(A)(ii) [100.]), AS AT THAT POINT THE 'ATTACHED DISCRETION' AT DCS Act, s. 67(6) "THE BOARD MAY" [100.] ([30. ('MAY')]), HAS MOVED TO 'DIRECTION OF PAROLE-RELEASE', PER DCS Act. s. 67(6) "IF THE BOARD SO RECOMMENDS, THE BOARD-(A) MUST..." [100.], THEREFORE, THE NEXT STAGE OF DUE PROCESS BECOMES OPERATIONAL (AFTER FIRST DECIDING IF STATE GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO PAROLE-RELEASE LIFER, OR, ENGAGE ONLY OTHER PERMITTED OPTION, s. 32 Application [38., 40. AND 45.]
1356. IS THE SAME MATTERS WHICH THE BOARD MUST ONLY FORMALLY CONTINUE TO PROCESS, WITHIN THE JURISDICTIONAL ENVELOPE OF COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY [SEE TEXT AT 1349. IBID.], AND ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS STATUTORY (DCS Act.), OBLIGATIONS (AIA [13.], [30.],
1357. IS THE SAME MATTERS WHICH THE BOARD MUST ONLY FORMALLY CONTINUE TO PROCESS, WITHIN THE JURISDICTIONAL ENVELOPE OF COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY [SEE TEXT AT 1349. IBID.], AND ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS STATUTORY (DCS Act.), OBLIGATIONS (AIA [13.], [30.],
1358. IS THE SAME MATTERS WHICH THE BOARD MUST ONLY FORMALLY CONTINUE TO PROCESS, WITHIN THE JURISDICTIONAL ENVELOPE OF COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY [SEE TEXT AT 1349. IBID.], AND ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS STATUTORY (DCS Act.), OBLIGATIONS (AIA [13.], [30.],
1359. IS THE SAME MATTERS WHICH THE BOARD MUST ONLY FORMALLY CONTINUE TO PROCESS, WITHIN THE JURISDICTIONAL ENVELOPE OF COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY [SEE TEXT AT 1349. IBID.], AND ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS STATUTORY (DCS Act.), OBLIGATIONS (AIA [13.], [30.],
1360. IS THE SAME MATTERS WHICH THE BOARD MUST ONLY FORMALLY CONTINUE TO PROCESS, WITHIN THE JURISDICTIONAL ENVELOPE OF COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY [SEE TEXT AT 1349. IBID.], AND ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS STATUTORY (DCS Act.), OBLIGATIONS (AIA [13.], [30.],

1361. DCS Act ss. 67(6)(A) "MUST", 67(6)(B) "MUST", 67(6)(A)(i), 67(6)(A)(ii), [100.], WHICH MUST BE THE ONLY MATTERS STILL 'OPEN' TO THE BOARD FOR 'DETERMINATION', THEN UPON 'DETERMINATION', MUST COMPLY WITH 'ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (WHEREBY A STATUTE (CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPETENT AND COMPLIANT [1., 3. AND 28.]), IS NOT TO BE TAKEN AS AFFECTING FUNDAMENTAL ALTERATION IN THE GENERAL LAW UNLESS IT USES 'WORDS' THAT POINT UNMISTAKABLY TO THAT CONCLUSION' ([64. (PARAS. 92, 93, 94, AND 117.)]),
1362. HOWEVER, EVEN IF SUCH 'WORDS' DO EXIST IN PARTICULAR SECTIONS OF RESPECTIVE STATUTE (EXAMPLE, [102., 103., 104., AND 105.]), DOES NOT BY THE FACT OF THEIR EXISTENCE ENSURE OR GUARANTEE THEIR CONSTRUCTION COMPLIANCE (WITH THE CONSTITUTION PROPER [1.], OR EVEN STATE ACT COMPLIANCE [28.]), WHEN
1363. COMPETENTLY ASSESSED FOR 'THAT' VERY PURPOSE (Q: DOES THE SPECIFIC SECTION COMPLY? YES OR NO !!!)), AND COMPLY WITH
1364. THE ONLY VIABLE PROCESS (IN PROCEDURAL LAW), STILL 'OPEN' FOR AUTHORISED ACTION, WHICH IS DESCRIBED AT DCS Act s. 67(6)(B) [100.], THEN THE
1365. NEXT VIABLE PROCESS (AFTER BOARD HAS ^{EFFECTED} ~~MADE~~ DCS Act s. 67(6)(B) [100.]), STILL 'OPEN' FOR AUTHORISED ACTION, WHICH IS DESCRIBED AT DCS Act s. 67(7) [101.], AND WITHIN THE JURISDICTIONALLY COMPETENT OPERATION OF SAME ([101.]), THE ONLY ACTIONS 'JURISDICTIONALLY PERMITTED TO BE ENGAGED' ARE CLARIFIED AND QUALIFIED WITHIN THEIR INTRINSIC WORDING (AS I HAVE EXTENSIVELY DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT), BEING (OTHER THAN A 'LEGALITY REVIEW/ASSESSMENT' OF THE DECISION OF THE BOARD TO 'RECOMMEND PAROLE-RELEASE', 'HOW LONG PAROLE ^{FOR} ~~MADE~~', 'WHEN DOES ~~MADE~~ PAROLE START'), "... ON RECEIVING
1366. BOARDS' RECOMMENDATIONS,
1367. ORDER THAT THE PRISONER BE RELEASED FROM PRISON ON PAROLE
1368. ON A DAY AND
1369. FOR A PERIOD
1370. SPECIFIED
1371. IN THE ORDER
1372. BEING NOT LESS THAN THREE YEARS AND NOT MORE THAN TEN YEARS." [101.],
- 1373.

1374. TO CONSIDER THE BOARD'S 'TWO INDIVIDUAL RECOMMENDATIONS' [SEE TEXT AT 1367, 1366, 1369, 1370, *IBID*], AS SAID TWO INDIVIDUAL (DCS ACT, SS. 67(6)(A)(i), 1375. 67(6)(A)(ii) [100.]), RECOMMENDATIONS ARE THE ONLY 'POSITIVELY, AFFIRMATIVELY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY DESCRIBED STATUTORY WORDING' [64. (PARA. 93, 94, 117.)], WHICH THE GOVERNOR [29.] IS EMPOWERED WITH 'DISCRETION' OVER [101.] 1376. "THE GOVERNOR MAY...", [30.] "MAY", BUT THAT 'DISCRETION' IS 'POSITIVELY' CONSTRAINED BY STATUTORY WORDING ALSO [SEE TEXT AT 1373. *IBID*], THEREFORE, 1377. THERE IS AN 'ACTIONABLE POINT' AT WHICH THE GOVERNOR [29.], NO LONGER HOLDS 'DISCRETION AUTHORITY' (DUE TO SAID STATUTORY 'DISCRETION' BEING WORD RESTRICTED (WRITTEN 'WORD' IN STATUTE IN SUCH A SPECIFIC IDENTIFIER, AND POSITIVELY, AND AFFIRMATIVELY, AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY, AND LEAVING NO ROOM FOR LEGITIMATE MISINTERPRETATION, SUCH AS 'TO CLAIM THE WORDING MEANS (IMPLIES), EVEN MORE INTENTIONS THAN IS ACTUALLY 1378. WORDED'), IF THE ACTIONS/CONDUCT OF GOVERNOR [29.], ARE SUCH THAT THEY ARE NO LONGER RESTRAINED/CONSTRAINED BY WHAT IS GOVERNOR'S ([29.]), COMPETENT AND JURISDICTIONALLY PERMITTED OPERATIONAL AUTHORITY [SEE TEXT AT 1365, 1367, 1379. 1369, 1370. *IBID*], THEN, GOVERNOR [29.] IS NOT PERFORMING/ACTIONING SOMETHING LAWFULLY 'OPEN' TO GOVERNOR'S INFLUENCE/INTERVENTION, SUCH 'CLOSED' ACTION/CONDUCT MUST INCLUDE 'VETO OVER BOARD'S JURISDICTION (ON BEHALF OF S.A. GOVERNMENT), TO BE THE ONLY STATE INSTRUMENTALITY COMPETENT TO MAKE THE DECISION TO RELEASE ON PAROLE' [SEE TEXT AT 1355, 1356. *IBID*]), AND, IF SUCH AN 'ACTIONABLE POINT' IS 'SATISFIED' (IN OTHER WORDS, IF STATE GOVERNMENT (GOVERNOR [29.] AND/OR PAROLE BOARD), CONDUCT THEMSELVES IN A WAY THAT IS NOT JURISDICTIONALLY AVAILABLE/OPEN/PERMITTED, THEN THEY HAVE 'SATISFIED' THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT (ACCRUED RIGHT), OWNED BY THE RESPECTIVE LIFER, TO BE EFFECTED BY JUDICIAL COMPLAINT (IN CH. III REALM [3.]), AGAINST WHAT WAS DONE ULTRA VIRES [82., 83. AND 213.], 1380. WHEREBY RESPECTIVE LIFER OWNS THE STATUTORY RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO LAW, SO THAT IF 'INCOMPETENT', 'UNJURISDICTIONAL' ACTION IS PERFORMED BY GOVERNMENT AGENT, WHICH HAS 'NEGATIVE INFLUENCE/IMPACT' ON RESPECTIVE LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION, THEN SAID LIFER HAS CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] RIGHT TO INITIATE 1381.